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 ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on the Restructuring of the Electricity Industry in the United States 
 
Vladimir V. Starkov 
 
 
The dissertation explores several issues that arise from the restructuring of the American electricity 
industry. The first chapter discusses economic reasons for deregulation, describes possible 
deregulation scenarios, and outlines potential pitfalls of deregulation. 
 
Chapter 2 develops a forecast of electricity prices after the transition to retail competition. The 
equilibrium prices are found from an n-firm Cournot model of oligopoly with non-uniform marginal 
costs. It is further shown how the translog cost function can be used in the traditional solution of the 
Cournot model. Major empirical findings include marginal cost functions of every producer and 
forecast prices of electricity after deregulation in all the NERC regions of the U.S. 
 
Chapter 3 presents an application of the theory of real options to the sales of power plants by the 
U.S. electric utilities. Observations of the divestiture transaction prices make it possible to infer 
expected future prices of electricity. It is found that under plausible assumptions prices for electricity 
have to be rather high for the owners of power plants to earn an attractive rate of return on their 
investments. Power plants divested by electric utilities, in general, have commanded high prices in 
the market, and the utilities selling them received generous compensation. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the question why some electric utilities are willing to sell generation plants, while 
affiliates of other utilities are buying them. The study applies a method of joint estimation of risk 
preferences and costs to assess the nature of attitudes toward risk of the U.S. electric utilities. The 
estimates of absolute risk aversion, relative risk aversion, and downside risk aversion are obtained. 
The absolute majority of electricity producers have been found risk averse with decreasing absolute 
risk aversion (DARA) and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). All the firms have been found 
averse to downside risk. It was determined that buyers of power plants have statistically lower 
degree of relative risk aversion than the sellers, as well as the rest of the firms. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the dissertation and discusses the directions of possible future 
research.  
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Chapter 1. Economic Arguments for Electricity Industry Deregulation 
 
 
Currently the U.S. electric industry is undergoing some profound changes. Utilities tightly regulated 
in the recent past find themselves facing challenges of the open market environment. The exclusive 
right of utility companies to supply electric power was punctured in 1978 when the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) allowed entry of non-utility generators into the market and 
stipulated conditions for the independent producers to sell their power. The Energy Policy Act 
(EPAct) of 1992 opened yet another avenue towards the open market. It clarified the authority of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to order owners of transmission lines (typically, 
large utilities) to provide non-discriminatory carrier service to all eligible generators for wholesale 
transactions. FERC Order 888 made such “open access” to transmission mandatory. The EPAct 
and Order 888 also set in motion the deregulation of retail distribution of power. More and more 
states have lifted the privilege of utilities to exclusively sell power at their designated areas and have 
given consumers the right to choose electric suppliers. Most of the current developments in the 
industry are directly related to the changes in retail competition. 
 
The political will to reform the electric industry persists due to several reasons: generally successful 
experience of deregulation in other industries, broad dissatisfaction with price differences across 
utilities, and large potential gains to consumers should prices of power decrease. Economic research 
has provided a broad basis for the policy of deregulation. A comprehensive review of projections 
and outcomes of deregulation in several different industries provided by Winston (1993) concludes 
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that economic forecasts of gains from deregulation were generally accurate. Although Winston’s 
study leaves out the market for electric power, a strong case against the existing regulation of 
electric industry has been built over the years. 
 
After electricity rates fell by 40 percent between 1960 and 1970, the industry was hard hit by the 
energy crisis and general inflation of the 1970s (Edison Electric Institute, 1983, p.89). Motivated by 
rising prices of fuel as well as increases in construction and operating costs, utilities sought regulatory 
approval of rate hikes. However, regulators in many cases were unable or unwilling to process such 
requests expeditiously, and although the price of electricity doubled in real terms during the decade 
of the 1970s, revenues of electric utilities failed to keep up with soaring costs, which resulted in 
decline of the rate of return on utility capital. This fact was reflected in the 1984 Economic Report of 
the President. Both the increasing costs and regulatory lag pushed utilities to pay a premium on their 
debt obligations which further promoted the cost spiral. From the second half of the 1970s to early 
1980s, ratings of many utilities bonds were downgraded. Many utility stocks were selling well below 
the book values (see, e.g., Males, 1984 and Navarro, 1981). Other problems electric utilities faced 
in the 1980s and 1990s included rising environmental costs, demand that fell short of projections, 
shortage of transmission capacity. This caused utilities to abandon many planned projects and some 
already underway (Berry, 1982). Shortages of electricity supply became a reality in certain regions 
of the country. Words such as blackouts, rolling brownouts, interruptible service became a part of 
the vocabulary in the decade of the 1970s. Ever since then, economists have pointed out several 
major flaws in the existing regulatory practices. One strand of research raises questions about the 
extent of scale economies that make the industry a natural monopoly and justify regulation. Another 
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branch argues that in absence of barriers to entry the monopoly power of utilities is not sustainable. 
Finally, some scholars argue that the issue of scale economies is irrelevant. As soon as bidding for 
the market takes place, competition will drive the prices down, at least for some consumers. 
 
Some notable work on empirical estimation of economies of scale was done by Komiya (1962), 
Nerlove (1963), Christensen and Greene (1976), and Huettner and Landon (1978). The universal 
conclusion to which those authors generally agree is that large-scale generation is economically 
efficient. Zardkoohi (1986), however, cautioned that the range at which the decreasing returns to 
scale begin could be overstated by the past research because the existence of economies of scope 
and vertical integration on the firm level has not been controlled for. Such a statement is in 
agreement with the conclusion by the Edison Electric Institute that interconnection, power pooling, 
and coordination among interdependent utilities reduced the minimum efficient scale in the electric 
system from 8,000-10,000 MW to 1,600-3,000 MW (Edison Electric Institute, 1982). In addition, 
Stewart (1979) advanced an argument that in determining effective unit costs, load factor is even 
more important than scale economies. Interconnection and free wholesale market can keep the load 
factor relatively high. Thus the competition in generation among smaller units does not immediately 
imply a loss of productive efficiency. 
 
The issue of economic efficiency of electric utilities was analyzed in detail by Pollitt (1995). He 
contrasted operating efficiency as an indicator of how close the firm is to the production frontier and 
allocative efficiency as the ability to achieve a cost-minimizing mix of inputs. Pollitt found that in 
terms of operating efficiency, privately-owned and publicly-owned utilities are on a par; however, 
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privately-owned utilities have lower costs than publicly-owned ones, which suggests that the direct 
government control has increased inefficiency. The observation that economies of scale are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to cause natural monopoly was stated by Baumol et al. (1982), which 
argues that only sunk costs give an incumbent firm the advantage needed to curb potential entrants. 
Thus, if entry is allowed to the market where firms operate without significant sunk costs, either an 
actual entry or the mere threat of it will keep prices well below the monopolistic level. Empirical 
evidence that contestable markets result in lower prices regardless of the issues of scale economies 
was collected by Primeaux (1975, 1986). He compared the costs of power producers in cities with 
two competing suppliers of power with the costs of monopoly suppliers in cities with similar 
characteristics. The conclusion was that even in a duopoly setting, competition causes firms to 
operate at lower average cost level than they would in the case of monopoly. 
 
Having reached a broad consensus that regulation in its traditional form is deeply flawed, economists 
have proposed numerous alternatives. Weiss (1975) and later Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) 
proposed various scenarios of a deregulated market for electricity and analyzed implications of each 
scenario. However, even if the choice of a particular reform scenario is made, the question of how 
fast deregulation should proceed remains. Gordon (1986) expressed strong support for a swift and 
comprehensive reform as opposed to a gradual one because the latter presumes greater government 
involvement which can only aggravate the efficiency problem. It is worth noting that deregulation of 
the electricity industry has been embraced not only in this country, but by many nations across the 
world. The book edited by Gilbert and Kahn (1996), presents the experiences and lessons of 
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deregulation from the United Kingdom, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Scandinavia, and the 
U.S.  
 
Although deregulation in the electricity industry has gained wide support by now, it is important to 
understand that the move towards a competitive market is not a simple task because it involves a 
whole set of issues never addressed before. A comprehensive legal analysis of most of such issues is 
provided in Sidak and Spulber (1998). One of the problems arising in the course of deregulation is 
just compensation of utilities for the investments made according to regulatory orders that seemed to 
be warranted in the past, but now are considered irrecoverable under market conditions. The 
industry name for such expenses is “stranded costs”. Examples of stranded costs are losses from 
extra capacity that sits idle and contracts to purchase power from independent producers at prices 
well above current market prices. Another problem of deregulation is that there is no guarantee that 
once the market for power becomes unregulated, prices of electricity to consumers will go down. 
Instead, power producers, freed from regulatory oversight, may find themselves in a tight oligopoly 
which makes it feasible to charge prices above marginal cost. Such a situation is referred to as 
market power. A possibility of future market power must be of concern to those in charge of the 
regulatory reform because the loss of consumer surplus from rising prices may very well offset the 
intended benefits of deregulation. 
 
This dissertation addresses several issues arising from restructuring of the U.S. electricity industry. 
The model developed in Chapter 2 provides a forecast of regional equilibrium prices of electric 
power after the transition to retail competition. The interaction among electric utilities is assumed to 
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be bounded by the present NERC regions within the U.S. The results of the Cournot model are 
contrasted with the Bertrand solution and regulated prices. It is found that Bertrand (competitive) 
prices are lower than average cost prices, but oligopoly prices are considerably higher. Predicted 
prices vary substantially among NERC regions, due to differences in average costs of producers 
and the industry concentration.  
 
Chapter 3 presents an application of the theory of real options to the sales of power plants by the 
U.S. electric utilities. Observations of the divestiture transaction prices make it possible to infer  
expected future prices of electricity. It is found that under plausible assumptions, new power plant 
owners will have to rely on market power to earn attractive rates of return on their investment. In 
general, power plants commanded high prices, and electric utilities selling them were generously 
compensated.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses the question whether risk attitudes drive divestiture in electricity industry. 
Observations of divestiture reveal that there are few newcomers in the market. The vast majority of 
the capacity sold is acquired by unregulated affiliates of electric utilities. The wide proliferation of 
sales in the environment that may not be characterized by asymmetry of information about the assets 
traded can plausibly be explained by different degrees of risk aversion of buyers and sellers. This 
study applies a method of joint estimation of risk preferences and costs to assess the nature of 
attitudes toward risk of the U.S. electric utilities. The estimates of absolute risk aversion, relative 
risk aversion, and downside risk aversion are obtained. The absolute majority of electricity 
producers have been found to be risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and 
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increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). All the firms have been found to be averse to downside 
risk. It was determined that buyers of power plants have lower relative risk aversion than the rest of 
the firms the sample. The buyers also have lower degree of relative risk aversion than the sellers. 
This indicates that the buyers of power plants tend to be more aggressive than the plants’ previous 
owners. Chapter 5 discusses some implications of the research and provides directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2. Oligopoly Model for Forecasting Market Prices of Electricity 
         After Deregulation 
 
2.1. Directions of Research on Market Power in the Electricity Industry. 
 
Under traditional regulation, investor-owned electric utilities generally earn an adequate rate of 
return. While some might expect utilities to resist deregulation that creates a more competitive and 
uncertain environment, some utilities have embraced FERC Order 888 and the subsequent state-
level movement toward competition in retail transactions. The support of deregulation by some 
power producers may arise from the fact that certain utilities believe they stand to gain from 
deregulation because the open market prices will be higher than the regulated rates they charge 
presently. Some other producers, however, stand to lose from the transition to competition.1 
 
This study develops a method to measure the amount of market power obtainable by U.S. 
electricity generators after deregulation of the retail electricity market. Interaction among electric 
utilities is assumed to occur within the regions set by the North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC).2 The map of the NERC regions is shown in Figure 2.1. Holding companies and 
independent investor-owned electric utilities are assumed to be oligopoly players, while other 
producers in the region are considered price-takers. The proposed method is applied in all the ten 
existing NERC regions to estimate equilibrium market prices  
                                                 
1 One most obvious distinction can be drawn between high- and low average cost producers. 
2 The reason to delineate  markets for electricity according to the boundaries of the NERC regions is that 
physical constraints limit transfer of power between NERC regions. Also, in some regions, such as MAAC, the 
firms historically have operated as a common power pool. 
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Figure 2.1. Map of the U.S. NERC Regions  
 
 
 
Source: North American Electric Reliability Council 
 
for both Cournot and Bertrand cases of oligopoly. In addition, indexes of market power are 
calculated for every region.   
 
While estimates of changes in market power after deregulation using ex post data are common in 
the academic literature, measurements of such changes ex ante are far less numerous. Studies by 
Green and Newbery (1992) and Green (1996, 1999) utilized a supply function method developed 
by Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Those studies modeled marginal costs of producers as either 
constant or linear. On the other hand, von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) argued that cost functions 
of the UK electricity producers are better represented by step functions. A stepwise function of 
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average variable costs was used by Rudkevich et al. (1998) to calculate instantaneous market 
clearing prices assuming interaction among n identical profit-maximizing firms. Andersson and 
Bergman (1995) used a conjectural variation model of oligopoly to find the equilibrium price and to 
explore the effect of firm size and the number of firms in the market on the price level. The analysis, 
applied to Swedish electric industry, showed that in Nash equilibrium unregulated prices will be 
higher than they are under regulation. Two papers by Borenstein et al. (1999a,b) presented 
assessments of potential market power in California and New Jersey electricity markets.  
 
Although analysis in this essay has the same goal as that performed by Borenstein et al., this study is 
significantly different in many aspects. My inquiry has a broader scope that covers the entire 
territory of the U.S. While Borenstein et al. analyzed market power under different demand 
conditions at several periods of the year, my study presents annual averages of prices and indexes 
of market power. Like the model used by Borenstein et al., my model does not incorporate 
explicitly dynamic aspects of competition which, in particular, would include possibilities of entry 
and exit. As noted by Borenstein et al. (1999a,b), some dynamic aspects may be captured by using 
several different demand elasticities in the analysis. The short run is characterized by relatively price-
inelastic demand, while in the long run demand is relatively price-elastic. While Borenstein et al. 
(1999a,b) modeled cost curves of generators using historical cost and capacity data, parameters of 
producers’ marginal cost functions used in this study are derived from estimates of a translog total 
cost function. Borenstein et al. (1999a) forecast the price of electricity delivered to consumers. Such 
a forecast must account for the costs of transmission and distribution. They modeled those costs by 
adding a constant markup to the production costs of all the generators. This analysis, instead, 
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focuses on prices at generation sites. I do not attempt to model transmission effects because even 
with the competitive power generation, transmission will most likely remain regulated and thus 
transmission charges will be determined outside of the market realm.  
 
Both Cournot and Bertrand outcomes of the oligopoly game are considered. A consideration that 
supports the Bertrand outcome in the market for electricity is the disincentive to raise prices above 
marginal cost that may come from implementing the market structure known as poolcos. In a poolco 
the right to make actual sales will be given to the suppliers who submit the lowest price bids. 
However, several studies have shown that the possibility of exercising market power in the poolco is 
also quite conceivable. One strategy described by Rudkevich et al. (1998) involves a cooperative 
agreement among producers to bid above marginal cost. Other way of achieving market power 
outlined by Newbery (1995) and Wolak and Patrick (1997) is deliberate withholding of low-cost 
units from operation and bidding the output of more expensive units to drive prices up. Empirical 
evidence of market power exercised by electricity producers in auction markets of England and 
Wales is found by Wolfram (1998). The sharp rise in prices observed in the California wholesale 
electricity market since the year 2000 may be due, at least partly, to the ability of the generation 
owners there to exercise market power.  
 
 
2.2. The Model of Oligopoly Interaction. 
 
Both Cournot and Bertrand models of oligopoly can be derived from a conjectural variation model 
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where p* is the equilibrium price, Y is the total market supply, yi is the supply by the firm i,  Y-i 
denotes total output of all firms except i, and MC represents the marginal cost.  
 
This specification (2.1) embodies all the classical models of oligopoly as special cases depending on 
the value of the conjectural variation parameter 
¶
¶
Y
y
i
i
- . The Cournot model is obtained when the 
conjectural variation is equal to 0. The Bertrand outcome follows when the conjectural variation is 
equal to -1. 
 
A “competitive” outcome where producers price their output at marginal cost can be found by using 
Bertrand conjectures in the model (2.1). The supply condition for a single firm is then given by  
 
p*(Y) = MCi(yi)     (2.2) 
 
The method of finding the Bertrand price used here is similar to the “competitive cost analysis” 
described by Torries (1998). Market supply is found by aggregating supply curves of producers, 
which are identical to the producers' marginal cost functions in a competitive market. Parameters of 
the marginal cost function are obtained by estimating a translog total cost function (see Appendix A 
for details). Market demand is set exogenously at its latest historical level (or, alternatively, at the 
level projected in the future). The market-clearing equilibrium price p*B will then be equal to the 
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marginal cost of the highest-marginal-cost producer(s) at the point where market supply is equal to 
market demand. A detailed description of the method used here to obtain the Bertrand prices is 
presented in Appendix B. 
 
Alternatively, equation (2.1) solved for the Cournot case produces the reaction function of the firm3  
p*(Y) 1+æ
èç
ö
ø÷
q
a
i = MCi(yi),     (2.3) 
where a  is the price elasticity of market demand, and qi is the market share of firm i, so that 
qi
i
å = 1. The aggregate market supply is obtained by multiplying both sides of expression (2.3) by 
qi and summing up across all the n firms, 
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After collecting terms and simplifying notation, equation (2.4) can be written as 
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where  hº q2 i
iå  by analogy with the Herfindhal index of industry concentration expressed in 
decimals.  
Substituting the definition of marginal cost, MCi = 
¶
¶
TC
y
i
i
, and the definition of market share,  
qi = yi/Y  into (2.5), a simple rearrangement leads to 
                                                 
3  See this result, e.g. in Varian (1992), p.290. 
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where ei  is the elasticity of total cost with respect to output of firm i.  
 
Equation (2.6) allows us to estimate the equilibrium oligopoly price ex ante, that is, before the 
actual oligopoly game begins. The values of the parameters in equation (2.6) are found as follows. 
Market output Y is set exogenously at its latest historical level.4 The price elasticity of market 
demand a is taken to be within the range suggested by various expert evaluations. An analysis of the 
price sensitivity to the elasticity of demand is then conducted. The output-cost elasticities ei are 
computed after estimating parameters of the translog total cost function (see Appendix A for the 
details on calculating ei’s).  
 
To determine the equilibrium Cournot price p*C, a simulation study was conducted. Reaction 
functions of every producer in the oligopoly were calculated as the profit-maximizing response in 
output to a given market price. The algorithm starts with a certain exogenous price of electricity 
common for all producers, and firm-specific levels of output. Every firm then chooses its optimum 
output within its own capacity constraints, expecting its rivals to hold constant their levels of 
production. Summation across the firms gives a new level of the aggregate supply. The new market 
price is computed from the constant-elasticity demand function p =
a
1
D
-
÷ø
öçè
æ
k
Y where YD is the 
market demand, p is the price, a is the price elasticity of demand, and k is a parameter. The market 
                                                 
4  Alternatively, it could be set at the projected level of demand in the future. 
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clearing constraint is imposed, so that YD = å i iy . The new price level becomes an input for the 
next iteration of the output optimization. The iterations are terminated when the aggregate output 
changes by less than 1 percent. The additional assumptions used in the method are as follows. Like 
in Borenstein et al. (1999a,b), it is assumed that oligopoly supplies the residual demand after the 
supply of the price-taking firms is controlled for. The value of k is found using the assumption that 
the demand curve passes through the historical point of demand. Specifying the value of k, however, 
is problematic because under regulation there was no uniform market price of electricity, rather 
electricity rates were based on average costs of generation and regulated rates of return on capital. 
The problem of uniform initial price was mitigated by a sensitivity study when several different price 
levels were used to initialize the algorithm. The initial prices were selected based on the average 
prices faced by consumers in every NERC region as reported by the Energy Information 
Administration.5 The resulting oligopoly prices converged to a fairly narrow intervals. In most trials 
the variance of the oligopoly prices was smaller than the variance of the starting values. 
 
2.3. Description of Data Used to Estimate the Model.  
 
Because this research aims to forecast prices of electricity at generation sites, the cost data used 
pertain to the generation sector of electric utilities. The historical cost and output data were retrieved 
from the database on U.S. electric utilities published by Utility Data Institute (UDI). The information 
on utility bond ratings necessary for the estimation of the cost of capital was obtained from Moody’s 
                                                 
5  Energy Information Administration. Electric Power Annual, 1998. 
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Electric Utilities Manual. The historical prices of utility stocks and returns on utility equity were 
found in the Compustat database. The price elasticity of market demand for electricity used here 
lies within the range suggested by various studies.6 A sensitivity analysis of the oligopoly equilibrium 
price with respect to the elasticity of demand was conducted. The results show that oligopoly prices 
rise substantially as the price-elasticity of demand decreases. 
 
The empirical analysis covers all ten NERC regions. The time period of the observations is from 
1982 to 1997. The sample consists of all electric producers in the U.S. classified as either 
independent investor-owned utilities or holding companies. Throughout the sample period, the 
structure of the industry is assumed to be fixed at the state it was at the end of 1998. Utilities that 
were parts of holding companies at the end of 1998 were treated as such from beginning to end of 
the sample period, and companies that by the end of 1998 were formed as result of mergers were 
treated as aggregated throughout the sample. Electric utilities that ceased operations before 1998 
were excluded from the sample. The total number of electricity producing firms in the sample is 99. 
The panel data set therefore consists of 1584 observations. This sample is larger than that of most 
prior studies. For the definitions of variables used in the estimation and the methods by which they 
were obtained, see Appendix C. The mean sample values for the variables used in the study are 
reported in Table 2.1. 
                                                 
6 Several recent studies used the following absolute values of own-price demand elasticity.  Borenstein et al. 
(1999a): 0.1, 0.4, and 1.0; Andersson and Bergman (1995): 0.3 and 0.6; Green and Newbery (1992) values range 
from 0.08 to 0.64. Estimates of long run demand-price elasticities by Halvorsen (1978) vary from 1.00 to 1.21 for 
residential sector and from 1.53 to 1.75 for industrial and commercial sectors. Short run demand elasticities of the 
residential sector lie between 0.48 and 0.78, and the short run estimate for the industrial sector is 0.42.  
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Table 2.1. Mean Sample Values of Variables  
Period of Observations 1982 - 1997 a 
 
Variable Mean Value 
Total Cost of Generation ($ 000) 1,740,427 
Net Generation (MWhr) 20,103,520 
Price of Labor ($ 000/employee) 56.789 
Price of Fuel ($/MMBTU) 199.76 
Price of Capital (%) 6.26 
 
a. All cost data are in constant 1996 dollars. 
 
 
2.4. Analysis and Results. 
At the first step, parameters of the total cost function are obtained by estimating the translog 
specification. The results of the translog function estimation are presented in Table 2.2. All the 
parameters of the translog cost functions are statistically significant, yet only four regional dummies 
are significant at the 5 percent level, and two more are significant at the 10 percent level. 
Monotonicity conditions were satisfied at every observation. Concavity conditions were not satisfied 
consistently, however, as noted in Thompson et al. (1996, p. 37), estimation of scale economies or 
other relationships between output level and cost is not affected by the incomplete satisfaction of the 
concavity restrictions. Although negative signs of coefficients for labor and fuel are contrary to those 
commonly reported, calculated elasticities of total cost with respect to labor and fuel are positive. 
The coefficients of the translog cost function were used to estimate firm-specific elasticities of total 
cost with respect to output as well as the parameters of firm-specific marginal cost functions. Then 
simulations were conducted to obtain Bertrand and Cournot prices. 
 18
Table 2.2. Coefficients of the Translog Cost Function a 
 
Coefficient 
 
Value 
 
Standard Error 
a0 4.245* 0.382 
bL -0.506* 0.028 
bF -0.494* 0.027 
bK 2.000* 0.063 
bY 0.393* 0.054 
bLL 0.608* 0.002 
bFF 0.568* 0.002 
bKK 2.012* 0.011 
bYY 0.031* 0.004 
bLF 0.418* 0.001 
bLK -1.026* 0.004 
bFK -0.986 0.004 
gYL -0.028* 0.002 
gYF 0.013* 0.002 
gYK 0.015 0.006 
ECAR 0.032 0.025 
ERCOT 0.349* 0.039 
FRCC 0.038 0.043 
MAAC 0.053** 0.028 
MAIN -0.123* 0.027 
MAPP -0.048** 0.029 
NPCC 0.494* 0.024 
SERC 0.010 0.036 
SPP 0.087* 0.028 
 
 
a. The estimated specification is  
ln TC = a0 + bL ln pL+ bF ln pF + bK ln pK + bY ln y + 2
1 bLL (ln pL)2 + 2
1  bFF (ln pF)2 + 
2
1 bKK (ln pK)2 + 2
1 bYY (ln y)2 + bLF ln pL ln pF +bLK ln pL ln pK +bFK ln pF ln pK + 
gYL ln pL ln y + gYF ln pF ln y + gYK ln pK ln y + REGION DUMMIES 
 
*    Significant at 5 percent level. 
**  Significant at 10 percent level. 
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The results of the simulation study are presented in Table 2.3. The number of oligopoly players in 
every region shows the number of producers used in simulations. “Competitive” prices reported 
here represent those formed in an auction when producers bid prices equal to the marginal cost of 
generation, and every unit of output is sold at the market-clearing price. The “competitive prices” 
also correspond to those formed under the Bertrand model of oligopoly. 
  
Table 2.3. Projected Prices of Electricity by NERC Region a 
 
NERC 
Region 
Number of 
Oligopoly 
Players 
“Competitive 
Price” b, 
$/MWhr 
“Regulated 
Price” c, 
$/MWhr 
Cournot Price, $/MWhr 
    Price Elasticity of Demand 
    -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 
ECAR 15 54.80 51.82 55.48 57.23 62.47 63.77 
    (2.83) (3.83) (2.02) (9.98) 
ERCOT 4 64.40 68.94 68.17 77.79 112.57 d 
    (1.14) (2.07) (59.26)  
FRCC 3 79.70 96.50 94.14 90.14 90.12 d 
    (9.99) (0.66) (1.22)  
MAAC 9 76.80 97.46 90.88 97.92 102.77 129.00 
    (3.29) (2.69) (3.48) (14.62) 
MAIN 10 55.50 70.76 69.87 79.30 82.73 99.58 
    (3.84) (6.31) (10.41) (8.43) 
MAPP 9 56.40 71.18 65.36 69.80 78.72 103.40 
    (3.25) (2.71) (5.52) (14.86) 
NPCC 20 121.30 111.86 142.70 157.58 154.46 177.60 
    (0.35) (10.13) (10.43) (21.89) 
SERC 9 60.10 69.44 69.78 71.65 78.55 108.43 
    (2.10) (5.19) (9.15) (16.25) 
SPP 5 63.10 76.44 69.78 73.86 76.78 83.22 
    (1.45) (2.96) (1.33) (4.99) 
WSCC 15 80.00 103.43 82.66 89.02 97.88 107.02 
    (2.44) (2.85) (9.81) (16.13) 
 
a. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Computed according to the Bertrand model of oligopoly. 
c. Computed as the means of producers’ average total costs weighted by producers’ market shares. 
d. At these values of elasticity, prices grow explosively. 
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The Cournot prices were obtained by the iterative procedure described above. To initialize the 
algorithm, two different types of conditions were tested. One that used historical prices and 
historical output levels represents a simultaneous transition for all the producers from regulation to an 
open market regime. (Because regulated generators do not sell output at a uniform price, several 
initial prices were used). However, if different electric utilities face different timeframes for transition, 
a market power regime will be unlikely to develop until the transition is completed by all the 
producers. Thus in the short run producers may price their output at marginal cost. This scenario 
was modeled by using Bertrand price and output as a starting point for iterations. The results 
obtained with both initialization methods were very close. The means and standard deviations of the 
Cournot prices are presented in Table 2.3.  
 
In general, the Cournot iteration method displays a robust convergence. The variance of the 
resulting prices was lower than the variance of the starting values in most trials. The Cournot prices 
were estimated for several different elasticities of market demand for electricity that lie within the 
range of expert evaluations, and tend to rise as price elasticity of demand decreases in absolute 
value. This is because an oligopoly can maintain higher prices in a market with less elastic demand. 
In addition to demand elasticity, oligopoly price is influenced by the sum of average total costs of 
producers.7 The higher the average total costs, the higher is the equilibrium price. This explains why 
regions with low concentration do not always get the lowest estimated oligopoly prices (e.g. 
                                                 
7  This can be seen mathematically when the definition of total market supply Y = åi iy  is substituted into the 
formula (2.6), which becomes p*= å÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
+ i i
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TC
h
e
a
a
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NPCC). Table 2.3 also lists the “regulated prices”. They were calculated as average of producers’ 
average total costs weighted by respective market shares.  
 
Comparison of the “regulated prices” with the “competitive prices” suggests that if the  market for 
retail sales of electricity is perfectly competitive, the prices of electricity at generation sites will go 
down in every region except ECAR and NPCC. Secondly, comparison of the “regulated prices” 
and the Cournot prices suggests that in the case of producers exercising market power, retail 
competition will result in higher prices to consumers, although in several regions prices may go up 
only by a small margin (e.g. WSCC, SPP). It is worth a reminder that the model estimated in this 
study explicitly assumes away trade with other regions. Conditions that promote inter-regional 
power exchange may be desirable to assure that retail prices of electricity will not rise sharply due to 
market power. 
 
Price markups are most often represented numerically with indices of market power. I provide the 
two most commonly used indexes of market power, the Lerner index and the Price-Cost Margin 
Index (PCMI).  They are defined as follows 
 
     Lerner Index = 
Actual Product Price " Perfectly Competitive" Product Price
Actual Product Price
-
* 100%,    
(2.7) 
 
    PCMI = 
Actual Product Price " Perfectly Competitive" Product Price
" Perfectly Competitive" Product Price
-
* 100%,          (2.8) 
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where the “perfectly competitive” price is equal to the marginal cost of the product. 
 
Those indices summarized in Table 2.4 point to the conclusion that the degree of market power in 
different regions will vary substantially. According to the Department of Justice guidelines, a market 
can be considered competitive if prices do not exceed their “perfectly competitive” level by more 
than 5 percent.8 The results indicate that if electricity demand is unit- elastic, which approximates the 
long run,  prices for power may approach their perfectly competitive level in several regions 
 
Table 2.4. Projected Price Markups by NERC Region 
 
a. Omitted because at these values of elasticity concentration indexes grow explosively. 
                                                 
8  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Statement Accompanying Release of Revised 
Merger Guidelines”, April 2, 1992. 
NERC 
 
Price Elasticity of Demand Price Elasticity of Demand 
Region -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 
 Lerner Index PCMI 
ECAR 1.22 4.24 12.28 14.06 1.24 4.43 14.00 16.36 
ERCOT 5.53 17.21 42.79 a 5.85 20.79 74.80 a 
FRCC 15.34 11.58 11.55 a 18.12 13.10 13.07 a 
MAAC 15.49 21.57 25.27 40.46 18.33 27.50 33.82 67.96 
MAIN 20.56 30.01 32.91 44.26 25.89 42.88 49.06 79.42 
MAPP 13.70 19.20 28.35 45.45 15.88 23.76 39.57 83.33 
NPCC 14.99 23.02 21.47 31.70 17.64 29.91 27.34 46.41 
SERC 13.87 16.12 23.49 44.57 16.10 19.22 30.70 80.42 
SPP 9.57 14.57 17.82 24.18 10.58 17.05 21.68 31.89 
WSCC 3.21 10.14 18.27 25.24 3.32 11.28 22.35 33.77 
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(ECAR, WSCC), but most regions will experience a moderate degree of market power even in the 
long run. 
 
The lowest across-the-board price markups are found in ECAR and WSCC, and the highest ones 
in ERCOT. The general trend is that, given the same price elasticity of demand, the larger markups 
are observed in the regions with smaller number of competitors. Markups are higher the more price-
inelastic is demand for electricity. 
 
There are reasons to believe that the forecast prices calculated according to the Cournot model 
reflect an upper bound of price rather than a mean outcome. First, there is broad agreement that the 
cost of power generation will go down as the industry is deregulated and competitive market 
incentives reduce overcapitalization and increase efficiency. Second, according to Green (1999), 
observations of the English spot market for electricity show that generators can raise prices well 
above marginal costs; however, if generators sell the entire volume of output forward, the incentive 
to raise prices above marginal cost disappears.9 If risk-averse generators seek to hedge their risk by 
entering forward contracts, prices of electricity may converge to marginal costs. Third, simulation 
results show that the low-cost generators operating at maximum capacity can supply enough power 
to meet baseload demand, while higher-cost utilities sell power only at peak demand. If, however, 
low-cost producers attempt to exercise market power by rising prices, the higher-cost producers 
                                                 
9 The market rules in California until the late 2000 did not allow electric utilities to enter long-term contracts, 
which left electric utilities without a mechanism to smooth the price spikes during the periods of particularly high 
demand. 
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will be able to compete for the baseload demand as well. If the low-cost producers prefer to 
protect their market share, their ability to exercise market power may be limited. 
 
Recent developments in the deregulated markets for electricity deserve some additional comments.  
 
1. Several deregulated electricity markets became a reality in the U.S., and the oldest two of them, 
California and PJM, have been operating for more than two years. The deregulated electricity 
markets are characterized by great price volatility.10 The annual duration curves for PJM show that 
from 80 to 90 percent of the time electricity prices stay at the level of short-run marginal costs, 
however, in the remaining 10 percent of time prices spike to levels that exceed costs of generation 
by huge margins.11 This indicates that generators have only a very short time to earn return on 
capital. In California, wholesale electricity prices stayed at the level consistent with short-run 
marginal costs from the time  the market was enacted up until the year 2000. Starting in May 2000, 
prices in California have soared to much higher levels, around $100/MWh on average with peaks at 
$750/MWh,12 and did not go down ever since. The popular explanation of the price spiral was that 
the increase in demand for electricity overstretched the available generation capacity (for the past 12 
years there were no capacity additions in California). However, California historically relied on 
imported electricity (as much as 25 percent of the power consumed in California comes out-of-
state), and enjoyed relatively low prices. Another plausible explanation of the price shock is market 
                                                 
10 Farney (2001) reports that price volatility in the wholesale electricity markets usually ranges between 400 
percent and 600 percent, and frequently spikes above 1000 percent. 
11 These data are available at http://www.pjm/com/pub/market_monitoring/indices/lmpfdi_monthly/index.html 
12  Source: archives posted at http://www.caiso.com/surveilance/pricedata/ 
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power. California’s electricity industry is highly concentrated. As much as 80 percent of the 
generation capacity there is owned by only 5 firms.13 The period of generally low prices from 1998 
until early 2000 might have been used by California generators to learn the oligopoly game. 
 
2. Divestiture of power plants changed the ownership of generation. In most cases, however,  plants 
have been sold in large bundles, which had little effect on market concentration in the industry. 
 
3. The new entry in power generation affects the supply curve of the market. Most of the capacity 
currently planned or built uses natural gas as a fuel. The generation cost of the new entry is thus 
sensitive to the price of the natural gas. While the operating cost of the new plants may not be the 
lowest in the system (running costs of hydro and some nuclear plants are lower), the new entry fits in 
the middle of the range, thereby “stretching” the flat portion of the supply curve. There is no way to 
draw a general conclusion on whether the new entry will lower the peaking price of power. On one 
hand, the new units increase the available low-cost capacity, on the other hand, the new units may 
be largely committed to supply the growing baseload demand for electricity. 
                                                 
13 According to Sioshansi (2000), the owners and their respective market shares are Pacific Gas & Electric, 24 
percent, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 16 percent, AES Corp., 16 percent, Reliant Energy, 13 
percent, Duke Energy, 11 percent. 
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2.5. Concluding Remarks. 
 
This study describes a method of forecasting electricity prices in a market open to retail competition. 
The results of both Bertrand and Cournot types of oligopoly are presented. The paper shows how 
the translog cost function can be used in the Cournot model. The method is applied to estimate 
equilibrium prices in the markets for electric power bounded by existing NERC regions. The 
projected prices are compared with those under regulation. The degrees of market power are 
assessed for every market.  
 
Results of the empirical study indicate that the predicted degree of market power varies from one 
NERC region to another. If the retail market for electricity operates as perfectly competitive, prices 
for electricity consumers will decrease from their regulated level in most regions. If producers are 
able to exercise market power as Cournot oligopolists, unregulated markets will result in prices 
higher than those under regulation. In the latter case, the price markups above the competitive level 
vary from one region to another. These markups are positively correlated with average total costs of 
producers and negatively correlated with price elasticity of market demand for electricity. The 
degree of market concentration has a lesser effect on the Cournot price because several 
mechanisms may limit the ability of low-cost producers to exercise market power.  
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Chapter 3.  Divestiture Prices of Power Plants as Indicators of  
Expected Market Power 
 
3.1. Background on Divestiture in the U.S. Electric Utility Industry. 
 
The structure of the electric utility industry has been rapidly changing in the past few years. The 
federal and state legislative initiatives promoting the deregulation of the industry coincided with an 
unprecedented wave of mergers, acquisitions, and sales of power generation plants. The ongoing 
divestiture14 of generation assets by investor-owned utilities (IOUs) has a profound effect on the 
electricity industry as it changes from a business dominated by vertically integrated firms to one in 
which the market for power generation is separated from the market for power transmission. A 
1999 report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA 1999, Chapter 6) shows that from late 
1997 through September 1999 32 percent of the generation-owning IOUs had sold or were in the 
process of selling generation capacity. According to the report, the generation capacity involved in 
the transition represented 17 percent of the total capacity owned by the U.S. electric utilities at that 
time. 
 
Industry observers indicate several factors that drive the divestiture. Legislation passed in some 
states (e.g. California, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island) explicitly requires 
electric utilities to sell some or all of their power plants (EIA, 1999). Moreover, utilities may use the 
sales of generation assets to reduce the firm’s risk. Many divestiture press releases indicate that 
                                                 
14 Divestiture conducted by electric utilities is defined here as the sale of assets to other companies or the 
transfer of assets to non-utility subsidiaries. 
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utilities use the sales proceeds to reduce their long-term debt as well as stranded costs.15 Additional 
risk factors that may arise from the lack of management’s experience in competitive markets, 
uncertainty about future prices for electricity and prices of  
inputs for its generation, as well as the uncertainty about future regulatory policy (Douglas and 
Starkov, 2000). Another popular explanation of divestiture is that a bull market for power plants 
makes the opportunities to sell too attractive for electric utilities to forego.  
 
For example, press releases summarized in EIA (1999) indicate that plants have been sold at 
multiples of their book values ranging from 1.5 for coal plants to 2.5 for hydro plants. Such 
information has fueled speculation that in order to recover their investments the buyers of the power 
plants must be expecting high prices of electricity in the future. The prices may be inflated, perhaps, 
by the market power of a few major owners of the generation. Contrary to that, the data collected 
by Douglas and Starkov (2000), based on the book values from FERC Form 1, show that the 
prices paid for most power plants do not exceed their book values by more than 30 percent (see 
Table 3.1). Nuclear plants are selling for much less than their book values.  
 
Although widely used as a yardstick, book value is the sum of depreciated past capital 
expenditures, and as such is a poor measure of market valuation of generation assets. A better 
                                                 
15 Stranded cost can be defined as the value of past investments that will be irrecoverable under future market 
conditions. Generation-related stranded costs of electric utilities are typically twofold. One part of them comes 
from building excess generation capacity, another from the long-term obligations to buy power from independent 
power producers. The stranded costs associated with generation assets of a particular utility may be computed 
as the difference between the accounting value of those assets (book value) and their “fair market value”. 
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Table 3.1. Characteristics of Plant Sales Occurred From 1997 Until August 2000 
 
Fuel 
 
Number of 
Plant Shares 
Sold 
 
Average 
Capacity, MW 
 
Average Price Per 
Kilowatt of Capacity 
 
 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
Hydropower 168 20 700.2 1.38 
Coal 64 530 558.8 1.27 
Gas 63 532 285.5 0.98 
Geothermal 1 1354 157.3 0.25 
Oil 55 202 478.1 1.39 
Nuclear 8 453 75.9 0.07 
 
Source: Book values from FERC Form 1, prices from press releases. 
 
measure should take into account future expected profits. In this paper, the theory of real options is 
applied to infer what expected future prices of electricity would justify the amounts paid for power 
plants in divestiture sales. The findings are that under plausible assumptions new power plant owners 
will have to rely on market power to earn attractive rates of return on their investment. In general, 
power plants commanded high prices, and electric utilities selling them were generously 
compensated. 
 
 
3.2. Mathematical Background on Dynamic Option Pricing. 16 
 
This section presents a mathematical derivation of the dynamic option pricing equation suitable to 
estimate threshold price of commodity that triggers investment in a project with 
                                                 
16 The material of this section draws on the monograph by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) who presented the elements 
of the method described below in various parts of their book. The idea that a production asset can be valued as a 
set of options was stated by Marcus and Modest (1984) and developed in detail by McDonald and Siegel (1985). 
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known investment value and known operating cost. We assume that investment commitment is 
irreversible, and the project value is uncertain. In this situation, an option to postpone investment to 
receive more information about future value of the project becomes valuable. We will show how the 
optimal investment rule can be found using contingent claims analysis under the assumptions of both 
infinite and finite lifetime of the project. Finally, we will provide comparative statics results. 
 
We consider the following investment problem. An investor has the opportunity to purchase a  
plant that produces marketable output. The uncertain future demand for output translates into 
uncertainty about the future price of output. The investor can purchase the plant immediately, or 
postpone the investment. If the investor delays the decision to invest, more information about future 
prices will arrive, although the uncertainty about the prices in the periods ahead will never 
disappear. Delaying the investment results in missed profits from the plant’s operation. Once made, 
however, the investment is irreversible, i.e. the investor cannot recover the funds spent if the project 
turns out to be less profitable than expected. Given these conditions, the option to invest in the 
project at any future date has some worth because of the uncertainty about the future value of the 
asset the holder of such an option can obtain. 
 
We will assume that the plant in our problem is a price-taker in the market for output. The operating 
cost of the plant is a constant C. The plant’s operation can be scheduled to avoid losses. If the price 
of output falls below C, the plant can be costlessly shut down. Once the price P is above C the 
plant can be costlessly restarted. There is no fixed cost of running the plant, i.e. when the plant is 
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shut down the cost of its ownership is zero. The shutdown or restart of the plant do not affect the 
value of the operating cost. Thus, the profit flow from the plant at any instant is given by 
 
pt = max [Pt - C, 0].     (3.1) 
 
The price is a random variable that evolves continuously according to the geometric Brownian 
motion with drift. 
dP = aPdt + sPdz      (3.2) 
 
Equation (3.2) indicates that the expected value of P grows at the constant trend rate a. The 
standard deviation of the growth rate is the constant s, while dz is the random increment of the 
Wiener process.17 The changes in market price are specified as the nonstationary Wiener process, 
as opposed to a mean-reverting process, for analytical tractability of the model.18 
 
In this framework, the valuation of the plant V is analogous to evaluation of a derivative asset whose 
value depends on P. The problem of valuation of the firm can be solved by either dynamic 
                                                 
17  The Wiener process is a continuous time version of a random walk. The random variable z evolving according 
to the Wiener process has the following properties. 
a) At any ith time interval ahead of the current interval t, the probability distribution for zt+i depends only on the 
current value of zt, i.e. the Wiener process is a particular case of the Markov process. 
b) The changes in z are normally distributed with variance that increases linearly with time. This can be written  
formally as dz = et dt , where et ~ N(0, 1). 
c) The increments of the Wiener process are serially uncorrelated, i.e. the p.d.f. of dzt at any time interval t is 
independent of any other non-overlapping time interval s. This property is implied by the condition E[etes] = 0 for 
t ¹ s. 
18 As indicated by McDonald and Siegel (1985) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.78), if the underlying random 
variable in the model of this type is assumed to be mean-reverting, the analytical expression for the valuation 
formula is not obtainable. 
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programming or by contingent claims analysis. Both methods produce identical results. Here we will 
follow the method of contingent claims.19 
 
Further, let us assume that the output of the plant is traded directly as an asset in financial markets.20 
As any marketable asset, the output of the plant will be held by investors only if it provides a rate of 
return sufficient to compensate the owner for the risk. Assume that the return on the output comes in 
the form of the expected price appreciation a, and a rate of dividend d. 21 The total expected rate of 
return is denoted by m = a + d. Assuming the exogenously given risk-free rate r, we can find m 
using the CAPM 
 
m = r + (rm - r) s
sm
rPm,    (3.3)  
 
 
where rm is the expected return on the market portfolio, sm is the standard deviation of the return on 
the market portfolio, s is the standard deviation of the return on P, rPm is the  
                                                 
19 McDonald and Siegel (1985) pointed out that such a project can be presented as a set of European call 
options. Exercising such an option means paying C to receive P that is realized during that instant. The project 
can be valued at any instant using a Merton variation of the Black and Scholes formula (the stock pays a 
dividend at a rate d) and then summing those values by integrating over time. The valuation formulas derived 
using dynamic programming or contingent claims analysis, however, are better suited for purposes of the 
present analysis. 
20  In fact, the contingent claims analysis applies as long as the financial markets allows us to construct a 
portfolio of assets whose composition is continuously adjusted so that the value of the portfolio is perfectly 
correlated with the stochastic process for P. This eliminates the requirement for the product to be traded directly 
in financial markets. 
21  Such a dividend on a stored commodity is commonly called “convenience yield”. 
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coefficient of correlation between returns on P and the market portfolio m. 
 
Now let us consider a portfolio that contains one unit of the plant valued at V and a short position of 
n units of the plant’s output each priced at P. The value of n is chosen in such a way to make the 
portfolio riskless. If this portfolio is held for a short interval of time dt, it will pay the riskless return  
 
r(V - nP)dt.      (3.4) 
 
The total return on this portfolio consists of the “sure” dividend and the stochastic capital gain.22 The 
dividend comes in the form of the profit flow pdt less the return that has to be paid to the holder of 
the long position of the portfolio ndPdt. The net dividend is therefore 
 
(p - ndP)dt.      (3.5) 
 
The (stochastic) capital gain of the portfolio accrued over the time interval dt is  
 
dV - ndP.      (3.6) 
 
Because V is a function of the random variable P that follows the stochastic process described by 
(3.2), the total differential of V according to Ito’s lemma is 
 
dV = a
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¶
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V
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é
ëê
ù
ûú
dz.   (3.7) 
                                                 
22 As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) pointed out, rigorously speaking, the dividend p(P) can randomly change even in 
the short interval dt. However, that change is of magnitude dt2 and it can be ignored. 
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Using (3.2) and (3.7), one can write the expression for the capital gains of the riskless portfolio as 
follows23 
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é
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ù
ûú
dz.  (3.8) 
 
The riskless portfolio must be independent of the idiosyncratic risk, i.e. we need to choose n so that 
the term dz disappears from the equation (3.8). The value of n that makes the portfolio riskless 
is¶ ¶
V
P . 
 
The capital gain of the riskless portfolio is then specified as 
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2
s
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¶
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2P
V
P
dt .     (3.9) 
 
Combining (3.5) and (3.9), the total return on the portfolio is given by 
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s
¶
¶
dp dt.   (3.10) 
 
Equating this to the riskless return (3.4), we can obtain the differential equation for the value of the 
project 
                                                 
23 The terms that go to zero faster than dt were ignored in the expression (3.8). 
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1
s2P2
¶
¶
2
2
V
P
+ (r - d)P
¶
¶
V
P
 – rV + p = 0   (3.11) 
 
Equation (3.11) can be identified as a second-order differential equation linear in the dependent 
variable V and its first and second derivatives. Its general solution can be expressed as a linear 
combination of any two independent solutions. It can be seen by substitution that a function of the 
form jPb satisfies the equation. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that the homogenous part of 
equation (3.11) has two independent solutions Pb1 and Pb2, where b1 and b2 are the roots of the 
following quadratic equation 
 
2
1 s2b(b  – 1) + (r  – d)b  – r  = 0.    (3.12) 
 
In terms of the parameters r, s and d, the roots of equation (3.12) are 
b1 = 
1
2  
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ù
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b2 = 
1
2  
- 2s
d )r( -
 - 2
2
2
2
2
1
ss
d r)r( +úû
ù
êë
é --    (3.14) 
 
Moreover, the roots b1 and b2 satisfy the following conditions:  b1 > 1, b2 < 0.24 
                                                 
24  This can be easily demonstrated mathematically. Denote x = 
2
1
2
--
s
d )r(
. Then rewrite the expressions for b1 
and b2 in terms of x as follows b1 = 1 - x + x r2 22+ s , b2 = 1 - x - x r2 22+ s . It is apparent that the 
expression under the radical is positive and greater than x, which renders b1 > 1 and b2 < 0. 
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The nonhomogenous part of equation (3.11), however, is defined differently depending on whether 
P is less or greater than C, so the equation has to be solved separately for the conditions P < C and 
P > C.  
 
In the region P < C where p(P) = 0 the solution has the form 
 
V(P) = kPb1 + mPb2.      (3.15) 
 
In the region P > C the solution is  
 
V(P) = aPb1 + bPb2 + P/d – C/r.     (3.16) 
 
Consideration of limiting cases helps to impose additional restrictions on the solution. When P ® 0, 
the value of P must be in the region P < C, and the plant is shut down. The chance of P quickly 
rising above C is very small, so the expected present value of the profits must be close to zero, and 
so should the value of the project, i.e. V(0) = 0. For this condition to be satisfied, it must be that m 
= 0. Further, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp.181-182) demonstrate that when speculative bubbles are 
ruled out, the term a must be equal to zero. Thus, the solution becomes 
 
V(P) = 
kP P C
bP P C r P C
b
b d
1
2
,  if  <  
,  if  >  + -
ì
í
î / /
   (3.17) 
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Because the Brownian motion is a continuous stochastic process, at the point P = C both equations 
must be equal. Additionally, the function V(P) must be continuously differentiable across C.25 
Taking into account these conditions and evaluating the function and its derivative  at C, we obtain 
 
kCb1 = bCb2 + C/d – C/r    (3.18) 
 
b1kC(b1 – 1) = b2bC(b2 – 1) + 1/d    (3.19) 
 
The equations solved simultaneously yield the solution for the parameters b and k. Here we state 
only the expression for b, as only b is important for the further exposition 
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1 1     (3.20) 
 
To create a parameter independent of C, we define q as 
 
q = ÷
ø
öç
è
æ --
- d
bb
bb
11 11
21 r
    (3.21) 
 
so that b = qC(1 - b2). 
                                                 
25 A heuristic argument is provided in Dixit (1993, Section 3.8); for a rigorous proof, see Karatzas and Shreve 
(1988, Theorem 4.4.9) 
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Next, we turn to evaluating the option to invest in the project F(P). This can be done using the 
contingent claims valuation again, only now the riskless portfolio will consist of one option to invest 
and a short position of n = ¶ ¶
F
P  units of the output. Using the same reasoning as above, we can 
derive the differential equation 
 
2
1
s2P2
¶
¶
2
2
F
P
+ (r - d)P
¶
¶
F
P
 – rF(P) = 0.   (3.22) 
 
Unlike equation (3.11) for the value of the project, the equation (3.22) for the option value is 
homogenous. The reason for this is that the option has no dividend or profit flow. Thus, the solution 
of the equation (3.22) is a linear combination of any two linearly independent solutions, i.e. 
 
F(P) = gPb1  + hPb2 .     (3.23) 
 
Again, we can obtain additional information about the coefficients of equation (3.23) by considering 
the limiting behavior of F(P). If the price is very low, it is very unlikely that it will soon rise to the 
level at which it will be optimal to invest in the project, i.e. to exercise the option, so the option to 
invest should be almost worthless when P is near zero. To ensure that the value of the option goes 
to zero as P goes to zero, the coefficient h of the negative power of P should be equal to zero.  
 
On the other extreme, when the price reaches the threshold P* at which it is optimal to invest in the 
project, an investor will acquire an asset of value V(P*) by paying the exercise price (the investment 
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cost of the project) I. At the exercise price P*, the value of the option must equal the net value of 
the asset obtained as a result of exercising the option,26 i.e.,  
 
F(P*) = V(P*) – I.     (3.24) 
 
Secondly, the theoretical considerations omitted here for brevity,27 imply that functions F(P) and 
V(P) should meet tangentially at P*, otherwise, one could do better by exercising the option at a 
different point. This can be written as 
 
P
*)P(F
¶
¶
= 
P
*)P(V
¶
¶
.     (3.25) 
 
Now we can apply conditions (3.24) and (3.25) to the functional forms for V(P) and F(P) just 
obtained noting, that the option to invest will be exercised only if the project makes a profit, i.e. 
when P* > C. 
 
g(P*)b1  = qC
(b1 – 1)(P*)b2 + P/d – C/r – I   (3.26) 
b1g(P*)(b1 –1)  = b2 qC
(b1 – 1)(P*)(b2 – 1) + 1/d     (3.27) 
 
The solution of this system of equations for P* is 
                                                 
26 This is called a “value-matching condition” by Dixit and Pindyck. 
27 Dixit in Pindyck (1994) refer to this as a “smooth-pasting condition”. See Ch. 4, Appendix C of their book and 
references thereof for details. 
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(b1 - b2)qC (1 - b2 ) (P*)b2 + (b1 - 1) P*/d - b1(C/r + I) = 0,   (3.28) 
 
which is the valuation equation used in the empirical analysis. The equation (3.28) solved numerically 
for P* provides an estimate of the average price of electricity that buyers of power plants should 
expect to earn the market rate of return m on their investment. 
 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 191) claim that the equation (3.28) has a unique positive solution for 
P* that is larger than the full Marshallian cost (the sum of the operating cost plus return on invested 
capital), i.e. 
 
P* > C + rI.     (3.29) 
 
We will use this property in the empirical part of the study to identify the region where the roots of 
the equation (3.28) can be found. 
 
The assumption about the plant’s infinite life can be relaxed. One can think of the project functioning 
a known number of periods T. The plant’s operation cost and output remain constant during the 
lifetime. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.205) show that in this case the value of the expected profits has 
to be discounted at the rate ( )1-
-e Td
d  rather than 
1
d  for the infinite-lived project. The certain 
stream of the operating cost incurred during the finite lifetime of the plant has to be discounted at the 
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rate ( )1-
-e
r
rT
instead of 1r  in perpetuity. It is easily seen that the finite-life discounting is just a 
special case of the infinite-life discounting. The finite-life rates become identical to the perpetual ones 
when T is taken to infinity. 
 
As before, the general form of the solution for the value of the asset will be different depending on 
the relationship between the price and the operating cost 
VT(P) =
k P P C
b P
P e C e
r
P C
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T rT
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Taking into the account that the function VT(P) is continuous and smooth at the point where P = C, 
we can write the conditions similar to (3.18) and (3.19) and obtain the value of bT. 
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Again, for convenience we define the parameter qT so that bT = qTC(1 - b2). 
 
We will assume that the option to invest gives the right to purchase a finite-lived project just once, in 
which case the option value will be expressed exactly as in the case of the perpetual project, i.e., 
FT(P) = gTPb1.  
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After combining the value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions, the equation for the 
investment threshold P* is found as 
 
(b1 - b2)qTC (1 - b2 ) (P*)b2 + (b1 - 1)(1 - e-dT)P*/d - b1(C(1 - e-rT)/r + I) = 0,   (3.32) 
which is finite-lifetime analog of expression (3.28) above. 
 
Comparative statics 
 
The algebraical expressions of total derivatives of P* with respect to other variables of the 
equations (3.28) and (3.32) are given in the Appendix D. Rather than analyzing signs of these highly 
complex expressions, we will provide intuitive explanation of the effects of various parameters found 
in the expressions (3.28) and (3.32) on the threshold price P*. 
 
We begin by reiterating the fact that the stochastic price P and the stochastic value of the project 
V(P) are positively related, as seen, for example, in the expressions (3.17). Because of this, 
comparative static results obtained for the value of the project hold for the price as well. 
 
An increase in the risk-free rate r reduces the present value of the cost of the investment I but does 
not reduce its payoff discounted at the different rate d, so the value of the option to invest F(P*) 
goes up as r rises. This increases the incentive to postpone investment. To induce immediate 
investment, the expected output price P* must go down, i.e. 
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¶
¶
P
r
*  < 0.      (3.33) 
 
According to the definition of the dividend accrued the holders of the plant’s output, d = m -a, an 
increase in d may be a result of increasing systematic risk of the plant’s output m or a decrease in the 
expected rate of appreciation of the plant’s output a. The greater the rate of the dividend accrued 
the holders of the plant’s output d, the more one forgoes by not exercising the option to invest in the 
asset. On the other hand, large d may indicate that the expected rate of increase of P is small, which 
will reduce the value of the claim on future production. Thus, there are two opposite effects of d on 
P*. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 193) claim that the sign of the combined effect is positive. This 
assertion is verified by scenario analysis in the empirical section of the essay. 
 
¶
¶d
P *  > 0.      (3.34) 
 
The increased uncertainty about future prices, expressed as increased s, the greater the value of the 
investment opportunity. The value-matching condition F(P*) = V(P*) – I implies that when the 
value of the option to purchase the asset F(P*) increases, the value of the asset V(P*) increases 
too, and so does the exercise price P*. Therefore  
 
¶
¶s
P *  > 0.      (3.35) 
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The comparative statics results presented above have to be interpreted with caution because the 
parameters d, r and s are interdependent. The return on the plant’s output comes in the form of the 
expected price appreciation a, and a rate of dividend d. The total expected rate of return is m = a 
+ d. If the investors are to hold a claim on a firm’s output, the total return on such an asset must be 
equal to the risk-adjusted market rate which can be found from the CAPM (Equation 3.3). The 
parameters a, d and s are related in the following way 
 
a + d = r + (rm - r) s
sm
rPm     (3.36) 
 
So, for example, an increase in s must be compensated by the increase in d if the other parameters 
remain constant. The sign of the change in P* will then be ambiguous. 
 
The effect of the investment cost I on the exercise price is easier to demonstrate when assuming 
away the operating cost. When C = 0 the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions (3.26) and 
(3.27) become 
 
g(P*)b1  = P/d  – I     (3.37) 
and 
b1g(P*)(b1 –1)  = 1/d       (3.38) 
Solving for P*, we obtain 
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P* = 
b
b
1
1 1-
dI.     (3.39) 
 
Since b1 > 1 and d > 0, it is apparent that 
 
¶
¶
P
I
* > 0.      (3.40) 
 
 
The presence of operating costs raises the hurdle that the price of the output must clear before the 
project becomes profitable. The optimum exercise price of the investment option must be  higher the 
higher is the running cost, i.e. 
 
¶
¶
P
C
* > 0.      (3.41) 
 
As discussed above, a limited lifetime of the project implies a higher discount rate of the future 
profits compared to the infinite-life case. To compensate for the higher discount rate the expected 
profit must be higher, ceteris paribus. Thus the exercise price of the limited-time option will be 
higher than that of the perpetual option, or mathematically 
 
T
*P
¶
¶ < 0.      (3.42) 
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3.3. Description of Data and Empirical Implementation of the Model. 
 
The application of the theory of real options to power plant divestiture sales involves several 
assumptions. The dilemma faced by an investor who decides whether to purchase a power plant put 
up for sale by an electric utility is as follows. Making an irreversible investment before the beginning 
of a full fledged market for electricity represents a risk because uncertain future prices for electricity 
make future profits uncertain and, ultimately, the future market value of the plant is uncertain as well. 
If the investment is postponed, more information about the future will arrive, although the uncertainty 
will never be resolved completely. At the same time, the delayed investment results in missed profits 
from the plant’s operation. The plant can be shut down at times when the market price for output is 
lower than the plant’s operating cost.  When a rational investor decides to invest in such a project, it 
must be that the expected future value of the plant allows the investment to earn a return on capital 
equal to or above the competitive risk-adjusted rate. When the price of output is a dominant source 
of uncertainty about future profits,28 the expected future value of the project is directly linked with 
the expected future price.  
 
Further, we assume that the operating costs in real terms and output of the plants in the future will 
remain where they were on average for the last 3 years of observations available (1995 to 1997). 
                                                 
28 The option pricing model used here implies constant production cost. In reality, the cost of plant’s operation is 
subject to variation according to conditions in input markets, while the output price is determined by supply and 
demand conditions for electricity. The largest component of a power plant’s operating cost is the cost of fuel. 
Observations of wholesale electricity market in the U.S. reveal that volatility of electricity prices is much greater 
than the volatility of fuel prices (see, for example, Farney, 2001). It is the difference between the price and cost 
that drives the model, and as Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 2.5) suggest, treating the more volatile variable of 
the two as the only source of uncertainty provides a good first approximation. 
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If costs of power generation will fall in the future, as expected by some observers (e.g. EIA, 1999), 
the estimates of the threshold electricity price P* will be biased upward. As a reference case, we 
use the model based on the assumption of infinite lifetime of the plants. Its results are contrasted with 
those obtained from the finite-lifetime model.  
 
Complications for the empirical analysis arise from the fact that most power plants are sold in 
bundles containing a diverse mix of generation assets in terms of their type, vintage, and capacity. 
Most utilities own a large number of plants and sell them in bundles consisting of several plants. Only 
18 sales made through the end of August 2000 consisted of a single plant. The largest bundle to 
date contained 74 hydroelectric plants sold by Niagara Mohawk to Orion Power Holdings. 
“Bundled” sales present a dilemma as to whether sales should be analyzed by transaction or by 
plant. If the sample is constructed by plant, individual characteristics of plants such as type, vintage, 
production cost, capacity, historical generation can be taken into account. The threshold price of 
electricity P* computed on the per-plant basis applies to a homogenous asset. The drawback of the 
per-plant analysis is that the price paid for the bundle has to be arbitrarily divided among the various 
plants. The method of assigning the plant price according to its capacity applied here29 does not 
capture the individual characteristics of plants that must affect their market value. The sample 
constructed on the per-transaction basis is free of arbitrary price assignments. Yet, as the 
composition of each bundle is unique, the valuation model will produce estimates of price thresholds 
that are less reliable for forecasting purposes. The application of the finite-lifetime formula has some 
                                                 
29 This method of assigning price to individual plants is the same as used by the EIA. 
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arbitrary assumptions as to the time of capital recovery, rather than lifetimes of individual plants that 
are supported by engineering considerations. To circumvent the described dilemma, two separate 
samples have been constructed. One sample contains observations by plant, the other has 
observations by transaction.  
 
The formulas for the optimum investment threshold given by (3.28) and (3.32) make it possible to 
infer what expected future prices of electricity would justify the prices paid for divested power 
plants. 
 
(b1 - b2)qC (1 - b2 ) (P*)b2 + (b1 - 1) P*/d - b1(C/r + I) = 0    (3.28) 
(b1 - b2)qTC (1 - b2 ) (P*)b2 + (b1 - 1)(1 - e-dT)P*/d - b1(C(1 - e-rT)/r + I) = 0  (3.32) 
 
The derivation of both equations was based on the premise that quantity of output produced is one 
unit per period. Thus, to convert the variables observed as annual totals to those measured in unit-
per-period, they have to be divided by the annual output which converts all measurement units to 
the per-megawatt-hour basis. 
 
In the plant-level sample, C is the plant’s operating cost per megawatt-hour of output averaged over 
the last three years of observations. The per-unit investment cost of the plant I was constructed by 
multiplying the price per megawatt of capacity paid in the transaction by the capacity of the plant 
and dividing the product by the annual generation obtained as three-year average of historical 
observations. 
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In the transaction-level sample, C was found as the sum of operating costs across all the plants in 
the bundle divided by the aggregated output of the plants in the bundle. The value of I was found as 
the price paid per bundle divided by the combined average annual generation of the plants in the 
bundle. The plots of the functions (3.28) and (3.32) in terms of P look like asymmetric U-shaped 
curves. In the range of P ³ 0 these curves may have zero, one, or two roots. The roots that fall 
below the operating cost can be disregarded because the plant will turn out zero profit whenever P* 
< C. This means that the constraint P* ³ C can be imposed when calculating the roots of the 
equations (3.28) and (3.32). The equations (3.28) and (3.32) were numerically solved for P* using 
Mathematica software. An example of such a program is given in the Appendix E. 
 
In addition to bundled sales, the ownership structure of the plants sold presents a challenge for 
analysis. Certain large plants are jointly owned by several utilities. Investors often wish to obtain the 
entire plant or the majority of its shares. On some occasions, all the utilities sell their shares at the 
same time (a large coal plant, Centralia, divided among eight utilities was sold to TransAlta in one 
piece). At some other times, different owners sell their shares at different times (e.g., Southern 
California Edison and Sierra Pacific Resources sold their shares of Mohave to AES Corp. in May 
2000, while the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power announced its willingness to sell its 
share in August 2000). Still other utilities never sell their stake in the plants (an example is a large 
coal-fired plant Conemaugh divided among as many as nine utilities: GPU Inc. sold its 16.45 
percent share to Sithe Energy in November 1998; Potomac Electric Power sold its 9.72 percent 
share to Allegheny Energy and PPL Global in May 2000; the remaining utilities did not announce 
their intention to sell).  
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For the purposes of this paper, the transaction is defined as a deal between one seller and one 
buyer. For example, a large plant owned by four utilities sold to one buyer would constitute four 
transactions, a utility selling 20 plants at one time to two investors each getting 10 plants would 
count as two transactions. A sale of a plant is defined as a transfer of one plant share in one 
transaction. In the example above, a plant owned by four utilities sold to one buyer would count as 
sales of four plant shares with the capacity and generation assigned according to the shares of the 
owners.  
 
The data set used in this study contains information on transaction dates and prices, as well as 
characteristics of the plants sold. The information about divestiture transactions was obtained from 
various sources, including the EIA Electric Power Monthly, trade press, company press releases 
and company Web sites. The plant-level data come from a database published by the Utility Data 
Institute that includes the information from the FERC Form 1 and other official sources. The data set 
explicitly excludes sales of nuclear plants. Considerations of decommissioning costs, costs of fuel, 
considerable regulatory uncertainty, etc., that usually accompany nuclear plant transactions may 
distort the price signal greatly. We have collected information on 66 transactions of non-nuclear 
plants involving 350 plants that occurred until August 2000. The earliest transaction in the set is the 
sale of coal-fired Fort Martin plant in West Virginia by Duquesne Light to AYP Energy in October 
1996; the latest is the purchase of the Danskammer Point and Roseton coal-fired plants in New 
York by Dynergy, Inc. from three utilities: Central Hudson Gas & Electric, Niagara Mohawk, and 
Consolidated Edison.  The total capacity sold exceeds 84.2 gigawatts. About half of this capacity 
(44 percent) was sold in the years 1999 and 2000. Steam-powered plants dominate the capacity 
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volume: 113 steam plants account for 70.5 gigawatt of capacity or 83.7 percent of the total capacity 
sold. The group of hydro plants has the largest count: 168 hydro-powered plants have been sold 
with total capacity of 4.2 gigawatt. The third group of plants, gas turbines, consists of 70 plants with 
total capacity of 9.5 gigawatt. 
 
 
3.4. Results of the Analysis and Their Discussion. 
 
The two samples grouped by transaction and by plant were analyzed, each under the two different 
scenarios of infinite and finite time for capital recovery. Both equations (3.28) and (3.32) have been 
solved under the same set of assumptions about parameters, namely: risk-free rate of return r is 5 
percent, rate of return on capital d is 10 percent, standard deviation of future electricity price s is 
0.2. The baseline number for s is supported by consideration of standard deviations of the daily 
returns on prices of several major power marketers during August 2000 (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). The 
use of daily returns on price to derive price volatility in practical applications is advocated by Farney 
(2001). According to Farney, the volatility of the S&P 500 index is about 20 percent. The scenario 
analysis was conducted to analyze the effects of changes in r, d, and s on the magnitude of P*.  
 
In the model with the finite-lived assets, the following assumptions on lifetimes were used. When 
analyzing transactions, the asset lifetime represents the recovery time of the invested capital. The 
capital recovery periods considered in this case were 20, 35, and 50 years. In the analysis by plant, 
lifetimes of different plants were assigned individually. The remaining  
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Table 3.2.  Next Day PowerTrax Index, Weighted Average, August 2000, $/MWh 
 
                        
 1 2 3 4 7 8 9 10 11 14 15 16 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 30 31 
 
                        
Cinergy 42 44 44 37 57 86 107 51 36 58 55 34 27 25 25 24 25 31 38 49 66 53 64 
Entergy 50 49 49 48 65 95 116 90 77 84 86 66 76 88 65 54 65 60 73 78 116 78 89 
TVA 48 48 53 47 67 99 120 72 49 64 61 49 53 52 37 35 30 40 49 61 71 60 68 
ComEd 43 42 43 36 53 75 88 49 33 54 57 34 27 25 26 24 26 29 37 48 55 48 55 
PJM West 54 54 57 42 57 93 125 62 43 50 46 38 32 29 27 25 25 29 34 45 54 46 49 
Palo Verde 483 518 388 257 212 198 200 169 129 223 231 218 229 166 209 210 218 224 195 220 217 181 102 
Mid Columbia 457 479 321 200 185 168 163 145 125 199 195 177 196 163 191 197 223 255 231 230 226 159 100 
COB 437 485 336 207 181 171 169 151 123 200 194 180 197 159 190 199 221 239 231 227 225 165 101 
Four Corners n.a. 525 n.a. 263 228 199 208 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 220 225 n.a. n.a. 206 224 n.a. n.a. n.a. 214 n.a. n.a. 
Mead n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 195 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
NP 15 362 335 n.a. 165 157 139 131 n.a. 113 172 173 178 196 151 n.a. n.a. 172 n.a. 181 188 n.a. 159 99 
SP 15 390 387 352 233 186 180 179 154 120 200 210 194 207 150 187 191 201 218 187 210 208 168 99 
                        
 
Ó PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
Source: Restructuring Today, September 5, 2000, US Publishing 
 
Table 3.3. Rates of change from the previous day price (a.k.a. returns) and their standard deviations, August 2000 
 
                        
 2 3 4 7 8 9 10 11 14 15 16 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 30 31 
 
s 
                        
Cinergy 0.05 0.00 -0.16 0.54 0.51 0.24 -0.52 -0.29 0.61 -0.05 -0.38 -0.21 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.35 -0.20 0.21 0.30 
Entergy -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.35 0.46 0.22 -0.22 -0.14 0.09 0.02 -0.23 0.15 0.16 -0.26 -0.17 0.20 -0.08 0.22 0.07 0.49 -0.33 0.14 0.23 
TVA 0.00 0.10 -0.11 0.43 0.48 0.21 -0.40 -0.32 0.31 -0.05 -0.20 0.08 -0.02 -0.29 -0.05 -0.14 0.33 0.23 0.24 0.16 -0.15 0.13 0.24 
ComEd -0.02 0.02 -0.16 0.47 0.42 0.17 -0.44 -0.33 0.64 0.06 -0.40 -0.21 -0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.08 0.12 0.28 0.30 0.15 -0.13 0.15 0.27 
PJM West 0.00 0.06 -0.26 0.36 0.63 0.34 -0.50 -0.31 0.16 -0.08 -0.17 -0.16 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.32 0.20 -0.15 0.07 0.26 
Palo Verde 0.07 -0.25 -0.34 -0.18 -0.07 0.01 -0.16 -0.24 0.73 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.28 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.13 -0.01 -0.17 -0.44 0.24 
Mid Columbia 0.05 -0.33 -0.38 -0.08 -0.09 -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 0.59 -0.02 -0.09 0.11 -0.17 0.17 0.03 0.13 0.14 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.30 -0.37 0.21 
COB 0.11 -0.31 -0.38 -0.13 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11 -0.19 0.63 -0.03 -0.07 0.09 -0.19 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.27 -0.39 0.22 
Four Corners    -0.13 -0.13 0.05      0.02    0.09       0.10 
Mead                        
NP 15 -0.07   -0.05 -0.11 -0.06   0.52 0.01 0.03 0.10 -0.23      0.04   -0.38 0.22 
SP 15 -0.01 -0.09 -0.34 -0.20 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 -0.22 0.67 0.05 -0.08 0.07 -0.28 0.25 0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.14 0.12 -0.01 -0.19 -0.41 0.22 
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lifetime of each plant was computed by subtracting the number of years the plant was in service 
prior to the sale from the useful lifetime of the plant. There were two sets of assumptions about 
useful plant lifetimes. In the “short-lived” scenario, useful life of a steam plant was 50 years, a gas 
turbine would last 35 years, and a hydro plant would work for 100 years. The “long-lived” scenario 
allowed 75 years of useful life for steam plants, 50 years for gas turbines, and 150 years for hydro 
plants. 
 
The values of P* that solve the equations represent the lower bound of the price of electricity that 
will make the transaction attractive for the investor in the sense of earning the return on capital 
comparable with other assets on the market with similar risk. Every observation has a unique value 
of P*. The resulting values of P* should be comparable in magnitude with the operating costs of the 
plants. Because different types of plants tend to have vastly different operating costs, the plant 
sample was further divided into three subsamples: steam plants, gas turbines, and hydroelectric 
plants. Generally, gas turbines have the highest operating costs, while hydro plants have the lowest.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the distributions of P* for the infinite-horizon model are summarized in 
Table 3.4. The same results are presented in the form of histograms in the Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The 
Table 3.4 reflects the results of scenario analysis to study the effect of variations in the parameters r, 
d, and s  on the threshold price P*.  Within the range of values tested, the following results were 
obtained 
 
¶
¶s
P *  > 0, ¶ ¶d
P *  > 0, ¶ ¶
P
r
*  < 0, ¶ ¶
P
C
* > 0, ¶ ¶
P
I
* > 0, T
*P
¶
¶ < 0. 
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Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics of Distribution of P* 
Infinite-Lifetime Model 
 
  Threshold Electricity Price P*, $/MWhr Number of 
observations 
        Mean Median Min Max Std. Deviation  
 Scenario 1: Risk-free rate of return r = 5%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 10%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.2 
Analysis by Transaction 109.88 74.06 21.64 1347.50 176.62 66 
       
Analysis by Plant 231.20 50.25 12.69 5370.24 546.57 353 
      · Steam Plants 84.97 54.69 27.77 1305.25 139.28 115 
      · Gas Turbines 914.01 666.67 17.50 5370.24 942.48 70 
      · Hydro Plants 46.80 29.37 12.69 647.10 71.09 168 
 Scenario 2: Risk-free rate of return r = 5%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 5%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.2 
Analysis by Transaction 91.14 59.28 16.07 1001.56 136.37 66 
       
Analysis by Plant 175.23 42.74 9.22 3906.21 403.84 353 
      · Steam Plants 69.74 46.37 23.97 967.40 105.35 115 
      · Gas Turbines 680.61 491.83 12.88 3906.21 693.79 70 
      · Hydro Plants 36.79 22.67 9.22 482.87 56.64 168 
 Scenario 3: Risk-free rate of return r = 5%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 10%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.4 
Analysis by Transaction 140.20 91.55 31.24 1943.70 247.01 66 
       
Analysis by Plant 327.40 61.39 18.54 7955.68 797.49 353 
      · Steam Plants 109.57 68.39 33.58 1889.22 197.72 115 
      · Gas Turbines 1318.6 970.94 25.57 7955.68 1382.84 70 
      · Hydro Plants 63.50 40.68 18.54 929.01 95.81 168 
 Scenario 4: Risk-free rate of return r = 3%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 10%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.2 
Analysis by Transaction 112.83 75.93 22.05 1373.11 180.26 66 
       
Analysis by Plant 235.30 51.71 12.81 5414.98 553.25 353 
      · Steam Plants 87.43 56.51 28.62 1328.59 142.29 115 
      · Gas Turbines 927.82 676.56 17.76 5414.98 952.23 70 
      · Hydro Plants 47.97 30.13 12.81 660.33 72.87 168 
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of P*  in the Infinite-Time Framework 
Analysis by Transaction
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Assumptions: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of electricity price 0.2 
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of P*  in the Infinite-Time Framework 
Analysis by Plant Share
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Assumptions: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of electricity price 0.2 
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These empirical findings are consistent with mathematical results described above. 
 
The data of the Table 3.4 show that although the means of the by-plant samples are generally higher 
than the mean of the samples grouped by transactions, there are vast differences among the sub-
groups of plants: samples that include hydro- and steam plants have means lower than the means of 
the corresponding by-transaction samples. The medians of both by-transaction and by-plant 
distributions are smaller than the respective means, which indicates that the majority of the points are 
below the mean, i.e. the distributions are skewed to the right. The distribution of roots in the by-
transaction sample has fewer outliers than that of the by-plant sample. This indicates that the 
variability of the transaction prices per unit of generation is lower than that of the prices per plant. 
This makes sense because the transactions contain diverse mix of assets. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the finite-horizon model are presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The 
distributions of P* are presented graphically in the Figures 3.3. and 3.4. Table 3.5 summarizes the 
analysis by transaction, and the Table 3.6 presents the results of the analysis by plant. The number 
of solutions found with the finite-horizon model decreases in comparison to the infinite-horizon 
model. The shorter is the time horizon the more this effect is pronounced. Graphically, decrease in 
value of T is shifts up the U-shaped graph of the function (3.32) in terms of P*. For certain 
observations, this leads to absence of roots. The analysis of scenarios with different lifetimes shows 
that individual observations display inverse relationship between the magnitude of P* and the length 
of the time period, exactly 
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Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics of Distribution of P* 
Finite-Lifetime Model. Transaction-Level Sample 
 Capital Recovery Time Threshold Electricity Price P*, $/MWhr Number of 
solutions 
       
 Mean Median Min Max Std. Deviation  
 
20 years 168.68 71.34 20.86 1296.24 357.07 12 
35 years 90.30 50.71 20.56 1279.03 211.62 34 
50 years 97.01 62.55 20.98 1305.80 178.65 55 
       
 
Assumptions used in calculations: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of future electricity price 0.2 
 
 
Table 3.6. Descriptive Statistics of Distribution of P* 
Finite-Lifetime Model. Plant-Level Sample 
 
  Threshold Electricity Price P*, $/MWhr Number of 
solutions 
       
 Mean Median Min Max Std. Deviation  
 
Scenario 1 Lifetimes: Steam Plant 50 yrs, GT Plant 35 yrs, Hydro Plant 100 yrs 
  
All Plants in Sample 420.55 33.20 11.94 8444.71 1078.24 233 
      · Steam Plants 143.52 50.92 18.90 1824.97 349.72 27 
      · Gas Turbines 1627.59 1070.13 25.77 8444.71 1754.63 54 
      · Hydro Plants 40.94 26.13 11.94 619.85 69.14 152 
 
Scenario 2 Lifetimes: Steam Plant 75 yrs, GT Plant 50 yrs, Hydro Plant 150 yrs 
  
All Plants in Sample 228.85 41.45 12.54 5275.51 549.59 317 
      · Steam Plants 78.85 43.82 22.14 1240.85 146.43 86 
      · Gas Turbines 907.87 655.97 17.19 5275.51 940.81 64 
      · Hydro Plants 45.88 29.06 12.54 644.16 70.64 167 
 
 
Assumptions used in calculations: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of future electricity price 0.2 
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of P*  in the Finite-Time Framework 
Analysis by Transaction
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Assumptions: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of electricity price 0.2 
Investment capital recovery time 50 years 
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Figure 3.4. Distribution of P*  in the Finite-Time Framework 
Analysis by Plant Share
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Assumptions: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of electricity price 0.2 
Lifetime of the steam plant 50 years 
Lifetime of the hydro plant 100 years 
Lifetime of the gas-turbine plant 35 years 
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as implied by the comparative statics. All the distributions remain skewed to the right which means 
that the majority of points fall below the mean. 
 
In the transaction-level sample, the number of observations that satisfy the finite-time model (3.32) 
varies from 18 to 83 percent depending on the assumed capital recovery time. In the plant-level 
sample, with its own set of lifetime assumptions, the number of observations that satisfy the finite-
lifetime model is from 66 to 90 percent. Within the plant-level sample, the smallest percentage of 
solutions was found for the steam plants, the largest – for hydro-powered plants. The lower 
explanatory power of the finite-life model may be due to the fact that investors view power plants as 
virtually infinitely-lived. As Ellerman (1998) points out, it appears to be a wide-spread phenomenon 
that operation of power plants is extended far beyond the limits formerly considered useful lives. 
This is especially evident for coal- and gas-fired steam plants. Ellerman cites three causes of such a 
phenomenon. One is the difficulty to obtain a new plant license due to environmental regulation and 
active opposition of communities. Second, with the deregulation of electricity generation, recovery 
of the capital invested in new power plants is no longer guaranteed, which increases the risk of 
investment in new generation capacity, and thereby raises the cost of capital invested in new plants. 
The third, and most fundamental cause, according to Ellerman, is that recent improvements in 
diagnostics and declining maintenance costs substantially prolong the useful life of power plants. 
Given that maintenance costs increase at a decreasing rate as the plant ages, a certain level of 
maintenance may extend the lifetime of the plant indefinitely. 
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The values of the observation-specific lower bound of the electricity price that would make the sale 
attractive to the investors provide insight on whether the investors’ spending is consistent with 
expectations of competitive electricity pricing or market power in the future deregulated 
environment. Using the calculated values of P* and the observed operating costs C, we computed 
observation-specific price-cost margin indexes (PCMI). The PCMI data for the results of the 
infinite-lifetime model are presented in Table 3.7, and those for the finite-lifetime model are shown in 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9. These results suggest that owners of power plants have to keep quite high 
price-cost markups to earn a market rate of return of their investments.  
 
Overall, the expectations of electricity prices expressed through the prices paid for power plants 
appear to be rather high. These prices are equivalent or greater than the oligopoly prices derived 
under conditions of inelastic demand in highly concentrated markets (see, for example, Table 2.3). 
The price-cost margins calculated using the option-pricing framework, generally, exceed those 
found under the oligopoly model (see Table 2.4). The finding of high expected electricity prices may 
have several possible explanations. 
 
“The winner’s curse” of power plant buyers. Almost all power plants were sold through sealed-
bid auctions. The prices observed in divestiture sales thus represent the highest bids, and not 
average willingness to pay across investors. 
 
Power plant buyers may have overlooked values of  their options. Instead of option pricing  
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 Table 3.7. Descriptive Statistics of Distribution of Price-Cost Margins  
Infinite-Lifetime Model 
 
  Price-Cost Margin, % 
       Mean Median Min Max Std. Deviation 
 Scenario 1: Risk-free rate of return r = 5%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 10%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.2 
Analysis by Transaction 160.83 115.39 23.21 881.52 156.51 
      
Analysis by Plant 361.51 223.88 23.21 1842.30 344.19 
      · Steam Plants 127.70 110.70 23.21 540.13 77.43 
      · Gas Turbines 521.39 518.79 67.23 1463.81 278.92 
      · Hydro Plants 454.94 298.37 57.24 1842.30 395.38 
 Scenario 2: Risk-free rate of return r = 5%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 5%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.2 
Analysis by Transaction 112.40 81.05 16.65 611.84 108.27 
      
Analysis by Plant 251.43 155.89 16.65 1284.06 239.02 
      · Steam Plants 89.46 77.80 16.65 374.43 53.52 
      · Gas Turbines 361.90 359.64 47.61 1018.80 193.53 
      · Hydro Plants 316.28 207.24 40.63 1284.06 274.91 
 Scenario 3: Risk-free rate of return r = 5%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 10%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.4 
Analysis by Transaction 240.06 168.92 32.58 1359.58 241.82 
      
Analysis by Plant 550.62 334.94 32.58 2859.90 535.39 
      · Steam Plants 188.45 161.82 32.58 826.52 118.59 
      · Gas Turbines 798.31 793.23 96.73 2269.02 434.12 
      · Hydro Plants 695.33 450.17 81.98 2859.90 616.12 
 Scenario 4: Risk-free rate of return r = 3%, Risk-adjusted return on capital d = 10%, 
Standard deviation of future electricity price s = 0.2 
Analysis by Transaction 167.88 122.41 25.01 887.77 158.17 
      
Analysis by Plant 369.42 234.20 25.01 1821.55 341.83 
      · Steam Plants 134.63 117.51 25.01 551.57 79.44 
      · Gas Turbines 530.73 530.40 71.87 1454.99 277.22 
      · Hydro Plants 462.92 309.83 61.30 1821.55 390.60 
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Table 3.8. Descriptive Statistics of Distribution of Price-Cost Margins  
Finite-Lifetime Model. Transaction-Level Sample 
 
 Capital Recovery Time Price-Cost Margin, % Number of 
solutions 
       
 Mean Median Min Max Std. Deviation  
 
20 years 377.59 352.47 64.98 919.96 253.48 12 
35 years 179.63 98.97 13.69 863.45 196.87 34 
50 years 152.57 101.96 19.58 865.75 168.42 55 
       
 
Assumptions used in calculations: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of future electricity price 0.2 
 
 
Table 3.9. Descriptive Statistics of Distribution of Price-Cost Margins  
Finite-Lifetime Model. Plant-Level Sample 
 
  Price-Cost Margin, % 
      
 Mean Median Min Max Std. Deviation 
 
Scenario 1 Lifetimes: Steam Plant 50 yrs, GT Plant 35 yrs, Hydro Plant 100 yrs 
  
All Plants in Sample 562.42 364.28 26.62 5091.63 572.81 
      · Steam Plants 167.22 115.03 60.14 795.01 151.78 
      · Gas Turbines 1054.86 948.53 51.58 5091.63 759.37 
      · Hydro Plants 457.68 296.96 26.62 1833.49 414.55 
 
Scenario 2 Lifetimes: Steam Plant 75 yrs, GT Plant 50 yrs, Hydro Plant 150 yrs 
  
All Plants in Sample 375.54 249.39 14.85 1841.14 362.27 
      · Steam Plants 106.96 80.24 14.85 508.54 88.30 
      · Gas Turbines 539.57 530.04 50.74 1643.64 298.79 
      · Hydro Plants 450.99 293.34 46.91 1841.14 398.10 
 
 
Assumptions used in calculations: 
Risk-free rate of return 5 percent 
Risk-adjusted return on capital 10 percent 
Standard deviation of future electricity price 0.2 
 65
model, power plant buyers may have used a discounted cash flow approach to arrive at the value of 
their price bids. The discounted cash flow analysis implies that the price paid for the plant should be 
less or equal the discounted present value of future operating profits. The future price of the 
electricity in the discounted cash flow model is assumed to always take its forecast value with no 
variation around the forecast. The discounted cash flow approach ignores the fact that investment in 
real assets is at least partially irreversible, i.e. the some or all the cost of investment becomes sunk 
once the investment is made. In addition, discounted cash flow model ignores the opportunity to 
learn more about future postponing the decision to invest. The dynamic option pricing theory, 
however, predicts that the investment cost must always be lower than expected value of the 
project. This is evident, for example, from the equation (3.24). 
 
I = V(P*) - F(P*).     (3.24) 
 
According to the boundary conditions, the value of the option to invest is zero only when the 
product is worthless, i.e. F(0) = 0. Application of the cash flow framework would induce investors 
to pay for power plants more than is warranted by the option pricing model. The higher is the 
investment cost I the higher must be the expected electricity price P* in order to allow the investor 
to earn the market rate of return. 
 
Imperfect observations and measurement of divestiture. During divestiture, electric utilities 
transfer more than just power plants’ capital. New owners receive the land under the plants, the 
assembled workforce, fuel stock, etc. The plant sites per se are valuable because their ownership 
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allows to build new capacity and upgrade the existing one without incurring the costs 
(environmental, regulatory, etc.) associated with siting a greenfield plant. Therefore, the prices paid 
for power plants in divestiture transactions may reflect the value of plants’ sites in addition to plants’ 
capital. The measurement of investment cost may itself be biased due to the method used to 
“unbundle” plants in the transaction. A better method of calculating prices of different types of 
plants is a subject of further research. 
 
Expectation of market power. Both economic theory30 and current events in certain markets (e.g. 
California) show that flawed restructuring of the electric utilities may result in prices well above 
marginal costs of electricity producers. It is plausible that the buyers of power plants may have 
expected to exercise market power. 
 
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks. 
 
This study presents an application of the theory of real options to the process of power plant 
divestiture in the electricity industry in the United States. Observations of prices paid for plants 
already sold allow us to infer the future prices of electricity that would justify the transaction prices. 
Two specifications were developed. One assumes an infinite lifetime of the production assets, the  
                                                 
30 The literature on market power in electricity industry is ample. Far from being exhaustive, the following 
references highlight some prominent recent work. Papers by Green and Newbery (1992) and Rudkevich et al. 
(1998) analyze market power due to strategic interaction in oligopoly. Market power arising due to special nature 
of electricity networks is addressed in Cardell et al. (1997), Wolfram (1998) and Borenstein et al. (2000). 
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other assigns certain finite life span to the power plants or a finite time for investment capital 
recovery. These specifications were tested on two different samples. One contained observations 
per transaction, another observations per plant. The study shows that prices for electricity have to 
be rather high for the owners of power plants to earn an attractive rate of return on their 
investments. Power plants divested by electric utilities, in general, have commanded high prices in 
the market, and the utilities selling them received generous compensation. The hypothesis of the 
bullish market for power plants thus found some empirical support. 
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Chapter 4.  Attitudes Toward Risk and Divestiture  
in the Electricity Industry 
 
4.1. Review of Research on Risk Attitudes of Business Entities. 
 
The ongoing deregulation of the electricity industry in the U.S. has brought about some profound 
changes. The recent federal and state legislative initiatives promoting the deregulation of the 
electricity industry have coincided with an unprecedented wave of mergers, acquisitions, and sales 
of power generation plants. The divestiture31 of generation assets by many electric utilities converts 
them from vertically integrated firms to providers of power transmission and distribution services. 
Some other electric utilities, however, have kept their power plants by transferring them to their 
unregulated affiliates, and some have purchased  more plants through the affiliates. In fact, 
newcomers are rare in the emerging market for power plants. A report by the Energy Information 
Administration says that about 82 percent of the capacity sold is acquired by unregulated 
subsidiaries of electric utilities (EIA, 1999, Chapter 6).  
 
Without taking risk preferences into account, such wide proliferation of the market for power plants 
presents a puzzle. If both buyers and sellers are industry insiders with long experience in the 
business, both parties should have symmetrical information about the traded assets and the same 
expectations about the future. In other words, both the buyer and the seller should converge on  the 
same expected net present value for a given power plant. Why would the trade take place? Risk 
                                                 
31  Divestiture conducted by electric utilities is understood as the sale of assets to other companies or the 
transfer of assets to unregulated affiliates. 
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preference theory suggests that if neither party can fully diversify the risk, the asymmetry of risk 
preferences will drive such a transaction.32 The deregulated market for power generation makes 
power plants risky assets because of uncertain future profits and long horizons of capital recovery. If 
the sellers of the power plants prefer to receive lump sums of cash now rather than an uncertain 
return later, they must be more risk averse than the buyers who are ready to pay to obtain the risky 
assets. 
 
Estimates of risk aversion are derived from observations about asset allocation decisions and 
budgets of investors. Much of the empirical research conducted in this field deals with financial 
decisions made by individuals. A study by Friend and Blume (1975) analyzed survey data on 
household asset holdings; in contrast, a more recent work by Dalal and Arshanapalli (1993) 
empirically estimated the demand for financial assets by the U.S. households. Bartunek and 
Chowdhury (1997) estimate a representative investor’s risk aversion coefficient using option prices 
data. Several authors have attempted to analyze properties of a utility function of business entities. 
An application of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility framework to risk in the petroleum industry 
was suggested by Cozzolino (1977). Walls and Dyer (1996) have extended the analysis to measure 
the risk aversion coefficient of firms in the petroleum industry. Analysis of risk attitudes is extensively 
studied in the literature on agricultural production. Saha et al. (1994) provide a good review of the 
research conducted to date along with the extension of research in the field. One of the most  
                                                 
32  There may be other reasons why equally informed parties will trade, e.g. to raise liquidity, or because different 
parties have different time horizons, etc. We assume that these reasons are of secondary importance in the 
market for power plants. 
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complete empirical studies of preferences along with the production process is found in Chavas and 
Holt (1996) where the analysis is applied to farmers’ decisions on acreage allocation between corn 
and soybeans.  
 
The estimation of risk attitudes in the electric utility industry described in this paper, appears to be 
the first study of its kind. We present the method of joint estimation of utility and cost functions that 
allows us to determine the nature of risk preferences of the U.S. electricity producers. We present 
estimates of the coefficients of absolute risk aversion, relative risk aversion, and downside risk 
aversion. These estimates indicate that the vast majority of electric utilities are risk averse. 
Decreasing absolute risk aversion is observed for all the firms. Majority of the firms have an 
increasing relative risk aversion. In addition, electric utilities are found to be averse to downside risk. 
The estimates of risk attitudes obtained here allow us to test a set of hypotheses about the 
relationship between the divestiture of power plants and risk preferences. The tests indicate that 
relative risk aversion of power plant buyers is lower than that of the rest of the firms in the sample. 
In addition, we find that buyers’ relative risk aversion is significantly lower than that of sellers.  
 
 
4.2. The Method of Joint Estimation of Utility and Cost Functions. 
 
The unique characteristic of the electricity market is that the amount of electricity demanded must be 
matched by the supply instantaneously to ensure reliability of the entire network. At the same time, 
electricity demand is highly cyclical. A typical electric utility faces daily patterns of high and low 
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demand, as well as seasonal trends. To cope with the volatile load profile, most electric utilities build 
different types of power plants which generally can be referred to as baseload and peaking units. 
The baseload plants usually require large initial capital outlays but have relatively low operating costs 
(e.g. coal-fired, hydro- and nuclear plants). These plants usually have large capacity and significant 
startup and shutdown costs, this is why they are rarely used to follow the demand profile. Peak-load 
plants, on the other hand, have relatively low capital investments but high operating costs due to the 
type of fuel used (e.g. gas- and petroleum-fired turbines). These plants are typically shut down when 
demand is low, and are restarted when demand is high. From the investment perspective, the 
different generation technologies available to electric utilities can be viewed as different types of 
assets. These two kinds of generation capacity are sensitive to different types of risk. Uncertainty 
about future prices of electricity heavily affects the riskiness of the large capital cost plants, while the 
fluctuations in fuel prices affect the riskiness of plants with high fuel costs. Most large electric utilities 
diversify their investments by building both types of capacity. 
 
The electricity industry uses a vast variety of technologies to generate electricity, ranging from 
renewable resources to nuclear power. In 1999 67.8 percent of all the electricity in the United 
States was produced by fossil fuel powered plants, 22.8 percent of the total output was generated 
by nuclear plants, and 9.4 percent by hydroelectric plants and plants using other types of renewable 
sources of energy (EIA, 2000). From the investment perspective, the different generation 
technologies available to electric utilities can be viewed as those that are capital-intensive (most of 
the baseload plants fall into this category), and those that are fuel-intensive (this category is 
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comprised of typical peak-load plants).33 These two kinds of generation capacity are sensitive to 
different types of risk. Uncertainty about future prices of electricity heavily affects the riskiness of the 
large capital cost plants, while the fluctuations in fuel prices affect the riskiness of plants with high 
fuel costs. Most large electric utilities diversify their investments by building both types of capacity. 
Thus the framework of portfolio theory can be applied to investment decisions made by electric 
utilities. 
 
In its most general form, an investment portfolio can be represented by just two assets with different 
degrees of risk and different expected return. The investor’s decision about the proportion of each 
of the two assets in the portfolio is based on relative magnitude of risk and returns of the assets, so 
a risk-free asset is not necessary to the analysis (Arrow, 1971). The method outlined below allows 
us to estimate risk preferences by solving the problem of portfolio allocation between two types of 
generation plants. 
 
We assume that a representative utility has two types of plants that differ in magnitude of initial 
capital outlays and operating costs per unit of capacity. The index variable for the type of the plant is 
i. Let x i   stand for the total capacity of all the plants of the type i owned by an electric utility firm. 
The annual output per megawatt of capacity type i will be denoted by yi. Therefore the total output 
of all the plants of the type i be found as x iyi. An uncertain demand for electricity makes the output  
                                                 
33  The power plants of  new type known as combined-cycle gas turbines are typically built as baseload units. 
The capital cost of these plants is usually much lower than that of the steam-powered baseload plants. Yet, the 
fuel cost of the combined-cycle plants is comparable to that of the gas turbines. This is why the combined-cycle 
plants in this study are attributed to the fuel-intensive technology. 
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per megawatt of capacity random. The firm, however, can choose the type and the capacity of the 
plants in its portfolio of generation assets. 
 
Because the firm’s decisionmakers can allocate capital between the two types of plants, they will 
maximize an expected utility of a von Neumann-Morgenstern type with respect to the choice 
between the two types of generation assets 
x
Max E[U(x, y, a)]     (4.1) 
where y is the vector of random variables, and a is the vector of parameters describing 
preferences. 
 
The firm’s choice between the two types of capacity will be constrained by the cost function 
g(x, y, b) = 0      (4.2) 
where x’ = (x1, x2) is a vector of allocational choices made by the firm, y’ = (y1, y2) is a vector of 
random output, and b is the vector of parameters. 
 
The Lagrangian of the described problem is 
L = E[U(x, y, a)] + m g(x, y, b)    (4.3) 
The first-order conditions are 
¶
¶
L
x1
= E
¶
¶
U
x1
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú  + m
¶
¶
g
x1
 = 0     (4.4.a) 
¶
¶
L
x2
= E
¶
¶
U
x2
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú  + m
¶
¶
g
x2
 = 0    (4.4.b) 
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¶
¶m
L
= g(x, y, b) = 0      (4.4.c) 
Solving (4.4.b) for m and substituting the result into (4.4.a) reduces the number of equations in the 
system to two. 
Q1 = E
¶
¶
U
x1
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú  - 
¶
¶
g
x1
¶
¶
g
x2
1
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
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-
 E
¶
¶
U
x2
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú  = 0   (4.5.a) 
Q2 = g(x, y, b) = 0      (4.5.b) 
 
To make the model empirically tractable, a parametric specification of the system (4.5) is needed. 
The value of expected utility depends on expected profit, which, in turn, is determined by the 
allocational decision x and random output y; i.e. the profit can be defined as p = (x, y). If profit p is 
distributed on the interval [l, h], the utility function can be specified as 
u (p, a) = 
l
p
ò exp (a0 +a1z + a2z2)dz    (4.6) 
where z is a dummy of integration, and a’s are parameters to be estimated.  
 
The above specification of the utility function follows that of Chavas and Holt (1996). This form of 
the utility function is very flexible. While the marginal utility of income is always positive (¶ ¶p
u  = 
exp (a0 + a1p + a2p2) > 0), the function can accommodate different types of attitudes towards 
risk. The attitudes toward risk are measured by the sign of the second derivative of the utility 
function. For example, ¶
¶p
2
2
u < 0 implies risk-averse behavior, ¶
¶p
2
2
u = 0 implies risk-
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neutrality, and ¶
¶p
2
2
u > 0 implies risk-seeking behavior. The measure of absolute risk aversion 
according to Arrow and Pratt is l = 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
- ¶ ¶p
¶ ¶p
2 2u
u . In this case l = - (a1 + 2a2p). A 
positive value of l indicates risk-averse behavior, a risk-neutral behavior is characterized by l = 0, 
and a negative l would indicate a risk-loving behavior. The derivative the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion with respect to profit is j = p
l
¶
¶ = - 2a2. Depending on the sign and magnitude of a2, 
the derivative j can be negative, zero or positive. Negative j  indicates a decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA), positive j  is observed in the case of increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA), 
and j = 0 shows constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Such a specification of the utility function 
provides a basis to evaluate empirically the nature of preferences displayed by electric utilities. 
 
Let ci be the annual operating cost per megawatt-hour of capacity type i, and p be the (regulated) 
price of a megawatt-hour of electricity during the given year. Then the annual profit from operating 
both types of plants can be expressed as34  
 
 p (x, y) = (p - c1)x1y1 + (p - c2)x2y2.    (4.7) 
 
A proposed parametric specification of the cost function is 
                                                 
34 The data used to measure c1 and c2 in the profit function are variable operating costs. Thus p in the expression 
(4.7) measures producer surplus. 
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g (x, y, b) = b0 + b1x1y1 + b2x2y2 - TC   (4.8) 
 
where TC is a total cost of generation in the plants of both types, which includes both the operating 
cost and the cost of capital. This specification is conformable with the linear treatment of costs in the 
profit function above. The coefficients b1 and b2 here represent marginal costs of capital-intensive 
and fuel-intensive technologies respectively, and b0 represents the total fixed cost. Thus, the 
estimates of b0, b1, and b2 are expected to be positive. 
 
Given the parametric specification of the utility, cost and profit functions, we can obtain some useful 
derivatives 
¶
¶p
u
 = exp (a0 + a1p + a2p2) = A0 exp (a1p + a2p2)    (4.9) 
¶
¶
g
x1
 = b1y1       (4.10) 
¶
¶
g
x2
 = b2y2       (4.11) 
¶p
¶x1
 = (p - c1)y1      (4.12) 
¶p
¶x2
 = (p - c2)y2      (4.13) 
 
The equations (4.9 – 4.13) can now be used to obtain the parametric specification of the model 
described by the system of equations (4.5) 
 
 77
Q1 = A0(p - c1)E[y1 exp(a1p + a2p2)] - A0
22
11
y
y
b
b
(p - c2)E[y2 exp(a1p + a2p2)] = 0,  
    (4.14.a) 
 
Q2 = b0 + b1x1y1 + b2x2y2  - TC = 0.    (4.14.b) 
 
For the purposes of econometric estimation, we append the right-hand side of each equation of the 
system (4.14) with error terms that are assumed to have zero mean. Further, we assume that the 
error terms are independently and identically distributed across the observations, but there is 
dependence between the error term of equation for Q1 and that of equation for Q2 due to 
interdependence between the profit and the cost functions. The assumption of cross-equation 
dependence makes it necessary to estimate the equations (4.14) as a system of simultaneous 
equations. We used a full-information likelihood (FIML) method to perform the estimation.35 To 
evaluate the expectation operator in the equation (4.14.a) we used numerical Monte Carlo 
integration. 
 
 
4.3. Empirical Implementation of the Method.  
      Assessment of Risk Preferences and Hypothesis Test. 
 
The data for the analysis come from a database published by the Utility Data Institute that includes 
the information from the FERC Form 1 and other official sources. The electric utilities are assumed 
                                                 
35  For details, refer to Appendix F. 
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to allocate their investment funds between steam-propelled plants and gas turbines. Utilities that rely 
heavily on other types of generation were excluded from the sample.36 The data set was organized 
as a panel containing 80 electric producers observed over 11 years from 1986 to 1996. Because of 
missing data, the number of actual observations was 831. Descriptive statistics of the data set are 
presented in Table 4.1. 
 
The presence of the exponential form in one of the model equations required data scaling for the 
estimation algorithm to work. The estimation algorithm was implemented using the Gauss Maxlik 
routine with embedded algorithm for Monte Carlo integration. The parameter estimates are 
presented in Table 4.2. All but one of them are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. 
 
As expected, the signs of b0, b1, and b2 are positive. After adjustment for scaling, the magnitude of 
b1 becomes 21.0, which is the estimate of the marginal cost of capital-intensive generation in dollars 
per megawatt-hour. The estimate of the marginal cost of fuel-intensive generation is 71.7$/MWh 
obtained by re-scaling the coefficient b2. 
 
The estimates of a1 and a2  can be used to obtain several characteristics of the utility of the firms in 
the electricity industry. The sign of the second derivative of the utility function with respect to profit 
reveals a general attitude toward risk. Given the specification of the utility function, the second  
                                                 
36  The excluded utilities generated more than 5 percent of their total output on plants powered by hydro energy 
and other renewable resources. 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Data Set  
Period of Observations 1986 - 1996 
 
    
Variable Symbol Mean Standard 
Deviation 
    
    
Residential Price of Electricity, $/MWhr p 84.417 22.015 
Average Production Cost of Steam Plants, $/MWhr c1 26.435 11.824 
Average Production Cost of Gas Turbine Plants, $/MWhr c2 355.778 1527.79 
Installed Capacity of Steam Plants, MW x10-3 x1 3.160 3.121 
Installed Capacity of Gas Turbine Plants,  MWx10-3 x2 0.481 0.645 
Annual Generation of Steam Plants per Capacity Unit, 
(MWhr/MW) x10-3 
 
y1 3.829 1.217 
Annual Generation of Gas Turbine Plants per Capacity 
Unit, (MWhr/MW) x10-3 
 
y2 0.369 1.001 
Annual Total Profit from Generation, billions of dollars p 0.691 0.699 
Annual Total Cost of Generation, billions of dollars TC 0.289 0.281 
 
Number of observations is 831 
 
 
Table 4.2. Estimates of the Model Coefficients 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
Estimate 
 
Asymptotic 
Standard Error  
 
Asymptotic  
t-value  
 
Approximate  
p-value  
     
     A0 1.805 x 10
-5 2.057 x 10-6 8.78 < 0.0001 
a1 -15.828 2.336 -6.78 < 0.0001 
a 2 3.351 18.233 0.18 0.8542 
b0 0.017326 0.00410 4.22 < 0.0001 
b 1 0.021036 0.000237 88.90 < 0.0001 
b 2 0.071698 0.00691 10.37 < 0.0001 
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derivative is 
 
¶
¶p
2
2
u
 = (a1 + 2a2p) exp(a0 + a1p + a2p2) = A0(a1 + 2a2p) exp(a1p + a2p2). 
 
Evaluated at the sample mean of profits of 0.69 billion dollars, this derivative is equal to  
-1.801´10-8. The negative sign of the second derivative indicates that the electricity producers are 
risk averse. In the framework of the choice between the two types of generation facilities risk 
aversion means that the electricity producers dislike risk exposure, and diversify their generation 
portfolios by building both types of capacity, i.e. both capital- and fuel-intensive plants. 
 
The risk aversion of electricity firms can further be characterized with the following measures: 
1. The coefficient of absolute risk aversion l = 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )-
¶ ¶p
¶ ¶p
2 2u
u
 = - (a1 + 2a2p) 
2. The coefficient of relative risk aversion r = pl = 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )-p
¶ ¶p
¶ ¶p
2 2u
u
 = - (a1 p+ 2a2p2) 
3. The coefficient of downside risk aversion d = 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
¶ ¶p
¶ ¶p
3 3u
u
 = 2a2 + (a1 + 2a2p)
2 
 
The estimates of the risk characteristics of the electricity industry evaluated at the mean of the 
sample are reported in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. Characteristics of Risk Aversion of the Firms 
in the U.S. Electricity Industry 
 
 Mean of the Sample Asymptotic Standard 
Deviation a 
   
   
Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion, l 10.369 10.858 
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, r 3.675 7.476 
Coefficient of Downside Risk Aversion, d 139.777 189.134 
 
a. Evaluated at the mean of the sample of profits, p  = 0.69 billion dollars. See Appendix G for details. 
 
 
All the risk measures calculated are significantly different from zero. The coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion l evaluated at the mean of the sample is positive. A higher value of absolute risk aversion 
implies stronger aversion to risk. Because the absolute risk aversion coefficient is a function of 
profit, each firm in the sample has a different estimate of l. The range of estimates in the sample 
varies from -4.75 to 15.27. Seventy-six companies out of 80 (or 95 percent) have positive 
estimated l, which indicates that those companies are risk averse. The negative estimates of l for 
the remaining four companies in the sample can be interpreted as a risk-loving behavior. 
 
The derivative of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion with respect to profit j  =¶l¶p  = -2a2 
= -6.702 is negative, hence the electric utilities must have a decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA). As discussed above, neither of the two types of plants owned by utilities can be viewed 
as riskless, thus the reduction of overall risk can only be achieved by diversification of the generation 
between the capital- and fuel-intensive plants. The finding of decreasing absolute risk aversion of the 
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electric utilities implies that firms with higher total generation capacity tend to be less diversified than 
those with lower total generation capacity. 
 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion r helps to compare attitudes toward risk among entities with 
different magnitudes of profit. Just as with absolute risk aversion, relative risk aversion coefficients 
are firm-specific. The estimates of relative risk aversion are positive for all but four companies.37 
The range of values of r is from  -23.86 to 8.04. The derivative of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion with respect to profit evaluated at the sample mean of profit is n  = ¶p
¶r  = -(a1 + 
4a2p ) = 6.579. The fact that n is positive and significantly different from zero indicates that the 
electric utilities have an increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). One interpretation of this finding 
may be that large firms have lower risk exposure. The range of values of n in the sample is from –
21.43 to 15.69. Eleven firms in the sample, or 14 percent, have negative estimated n which 
indicates decreasing relative risk aversion. 
  
The coefficient of downside risk aversion d is positive which indicates aversion to the distribution of 
profits skewed to the left, or aversion to downside risk. The latter result is in accord with theory 
because DARA preferences imply a positive sign of the third derivative of the utility function with 
respect to profits (Pratt, 1964; Menezes et al., 1980). The aversion to downside risk indicates 
aversion to losses. The range of d values in the sample is from 20.83 to 240.16. There are no firms 
                                                 
37 These are the same five companies that were found to possess an increasing absolute risk aversion. 
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with negative downside risk aversion. This result is in agreement with the conclusion of Menezes et 
al. (1980) that both risk avoiders and risk takers can be downside risk averse. 
 
Because this study appears to be the first to estimate the risk preferences of electric utilities, direct 
comparison of the results with other studies of the industry is not possible. Yet the estimators can be 
compared with those obtained in the studies of risk preferences of other agents. Using the model of 
acreage decisions between corn and soybeans by U.S. farmers, Chavas and Holt (1996) find an 
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient of 12.17, a relative risk aversion coefficient of 6.07, 
and a downside risk aversion coefficient equal to 157.27. In his study of Kansas wheat producers 
Saha (1997) finds the absolute risk aversion of small firms to be around 0.90 and the absolute risk 
aversion of large firms around 0.53. The summary provided by Saha et al. (1994) shows that 
different studies of agriculture report coefficients of absolute risk aversion ranging from 0 to 14.75, 
and coefficients of relative risk aversion ranging from 0 to 18.80. Friend and Blume (1975) 
conclude that the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the U.S. households is larger than unity, and 
is, probably, in the neighborhood of 2.0. Dalal and Arshanapalli (1993) provide an estimate of the 
relative risk aversion coefficient of about 1.3. Hansen and Singleton (1983) used a framework of 
production-exchange economy in which identical agents seek to maximize the intertemporal utility of 
consumption. This study puts the estimate of relative risk aversion between zero and two. Wolf and 
Pohlman (1983) estimated risk preferences of a dealer of U.S. government bonds based on its bids. 
Their assessment of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is 4. Using time series data on the value 
of the assets insured by various economic agents in the U.S., Szpiro (1986) estimated the degree of 
relative risk aversion to be between 1.2 and 1.8. In the study of oil exploration industry, Walls and 
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Dyer (1996) calculated the risk aversion coefficient of ARCO, a major oil company, during the 
period from 1983 to 1990. The reported values of the risk aversion coefficient are ranging from 30 
to 44 when the monetary values are expressed in billions of dollars. Compared to the existing 
empirical estimates of risk preferences, the risk aversion of electric utilities found in this study may 
be considered moderate.  
 
With the estimates of risk aversion in hand, the hypothesis on whether the divestiture process is 
driven by the risk attitudes of the participants can be tested. More specifically, we can pose the 
following questions: 
 
a) Do the sellers display higher relative risk aversion than the rest of the firms in the sample? 
b) Is the relative risk aversion of the buyers lower than that of the rest of the firms?  
c) Is the relative risk aversion of the sellers larger than that of the buyers? 
 
The answers to these questions can be obtained by testing whether the means of the two samples 
under consideration are statistically different. 
 
The information on agents participating in the market for generation assets was collected jointly by 
Professor Stratford Douglas, graduate research assistant Matthew McPherson, and the author. The 
time span of those observations extends from late 1996 until the end of August 2000. The 
divestiture data were matched with the sample of the utilities used for the estimation of risk 
preferences. Out of the 80 firms in the sample, forty-one have been involved in transactions with 
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power plants. Twenty-three firms have sold their power plants either directly or through their 
holding companies. Twenty-two firms have bought plants through their affiliates. Four firms in the 
sample conducted both sales and purchases.  
 
The procedure of testing whether two samples of random variables belong to distributions with the 
same means and variances is outlined in Hogg and Craig (1995, p. 277). The two samples of 
normally distributed random variables X and Y  contain n and m observations respectively. The 
means of the samples are X  and Y , and the variances are s12 and s22. If the two samples are 
drawn from the same normal distribution, the respective first and second moments of the two 
populations must be the same. This can be tested with the following statistic 
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,     (4.15) 
which has a t-distribution with n + m - 2 degrees of freedom. 
 
The results of this test are presented in Table 4.4. The firms that acted as both buyers and sellers 
were excluded from the samples. 
 
The results of the hypotheses test show statistical evidence that the buyers of power plants have 
lower relative risk aversion than the rest of the firms the sample, as well as indicate that the buyers 
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Table 4.4. Comparison of Risk Attitudes Among Different Groups of Firms 
 
     Relative Risk Aversion, 
Sample Average 
Samples  
Compared 
Degrees of  
Freedom 
T Values for the Sample 
Mean Comparison 
     
     
Whole Sample 3.675 Sellers vs. Rest 74 0.94 
Sellers 4.884 Buyers vs. Rest 74 -3.09* 
Buyers 1.198 Buyers vs. Sellers  35 -1.81* 
 
* significant at 5 percent level 
 
 
have lower degree of relative risk aversion than the sellers. However, there is no evidence that the 
sellers of power plants have higher than the rest relative risk aversion. 
 
4.4. Concluding Remarks. 
 
This study applies a method of joint estimation of risk preferences and costs to assess the nature of 
attitudes toward risk of U.S. electric utilities. The two generation assets with different risk 
characteristics considered here are capital-intensive plants and fuel-intensive plants. The allocation 
of capital between these two assets by electric utilities was studied to reveal the risk aversion 
characteristics of the firms’ decisionmakers. A full-information maximum likelihood method (FIML) 
was used to jointly estimate utility and cost functions of the U.S. electricity producers. We estimate 
the coefficients of absolute risk aversion, relative risk aversion, and downside risk aversion. The 
vast majority of the electricity producers (94 percent) have been found to be risk averse. Utility 
functions of all the producers exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Majority of the 
firms (86 percent) have an increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). All the firms have been 
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found averse to downside risk. A set of hypotheses on whether the divestiture of power plants is 
driven by risk preferences was tested. The relative risk aversion of the buyers of power plants was 
found to be significantly lower than that of the rest of the firms in the sample. In addition, the relative 
risk aversion of the buyers was found to be lower than the relative risk aversion of the sellers. This 
indicates that the buyers of power plants tend to be more aggressive than the plants’ previous 
owners. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions and Perspectives of Future Research 
 
 
This dissertation explores several issues that arise from the restructuring of the American electricity 
industry. The introductory chapter discusses economic reasons for deregulation, describes possible 
deregulation scenarios, and outlines potential pitfalls of deregulation. 
 
The first essay describes a method of forecasting electricity prices based on an oligopoly model. 
The method is applied to estimate equilibrium prices in the markets for electric power bounded by 
existing NERC regions. The projected oligopoly prices are compared with those under competitive 
scenario and those that prevailed under regulation. The results of the study indicate that the 
predicted degree of market power varies from one NERC region to another. If the retail market for 
electricity operates as perfectly competitive, prices for electricity consumers will decrease from their 
regulated level in most regions. If producers are able to exercise market power as Cournot 
oligopolists, unregulated markets will result in prices higher than those under regulation. The price 
markups are positively correlated with average total costs of producers and negatively correlated 
with price elasticity of market demand for electricity. The degree of market concentration has a 
lesser effect on the Cournot price because several mechanisms may limit the ability of low-cost 
producers to exercise market power. Future research on this topic may incorporate a different 
definition of the market. Recent developments show that electricity markets are forming within the 
boundaries of ISO (Independent System Operator) or RTO (Regional Transmission Organizations) 
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that are smaller than whole NERC regions. The market boundaries usually coincide with physical 
constraints imposed by relatively “thin” interconnections. Trade across market boundaries may be 
considered as well, as long as the limits of transmission are taken into account. Future research 
should also account for the changed ownership structure of the electricity industry. Recent mergers 
and divestitures have dramatically changed the faces of the game, although, arguably, their impact on 
the industry concentration was only minor. Another desirable aspect of future research would be 
incorporating some dynamics into the model. On the supply side, the new entry should be explicitly 
considered. The new entrants will most likely fit in the middle of the market supply curve which will 
make the flat portion of this curve longer. On the demand side, growth in demand should be 
accounted for. The market prices in such a model will be impacted by the relative rates of growth in 
both supply and demand in addition to the factors already considered.   
 
In the second essay of the dissertation, the theory of real options is applied to calculate expected 
future prices of electricity that would justify the amounts paid for power plants in divestiture sales. 
The study finds that under plausible assumptions new power plant owners will have to rely on 
market power to earn attractive rates of return on their investment. In general, power plants 
commanded high prices, and electric utilities selling them were generously compensated. Future 
research may focus on improving the methodology of measuring investment cost of individual plants 
sold in “bundles”. In addition, a study of stock prices of both buyers and sellers may be conducted 
to find whether transactions of power plants have generated excess returns.38 The results of such  
                                                 
38 I thank Jon Vilasuso for this suggestion. 
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study may reveal ex ante market expectations of future profits, and as such, they could be used to 
forecast electricity prices. 
 
The third essay of the dissertation applies a method of joint estimation of risk preferences and costs 
to assess the nature of risk attitudes of the U.S. electric utilities. To reveal the risk aversion 
characteristics of the firms’ decisionmakers, the allocation of capital between capital-intensive and 
fuel-intensive plants was studied. The estimates of the coefficients of absolute risk aversion, relative 
risk aversion, and downside risk aversion were obtained. The vast majority of the electricity 
producers (94 percent) have been found to be risk averse. Utility functions of all the producers 
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Majority of the firms (86 percent) have an 
increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). All the firms have been found averse to downside risk. 
A set of hypotheses on whether the divestiture of power plants is driven by risk preferences was 
tested. The relative risk aversion of the buyers of power plants was found to be significantly lower 
than that of the rest of the firms in the sample. In addition, the relative risk aversion of the buyers 
was found to be higher than the relative risk aversion of the sellers. This indicates that the buyers of 
power plants tend to be more aggressive than their previous owners. Future research may use an 
alternative empirical methodology, e.g. generalized method of moments or GMM,39 or a different 
form of utility function40 to test robustness of the results. In addition, more insight may be obtained 
by analyzing firm-specific parameters of risk aversion. 
                                                 
39 This comment was suggested by Jon Vilasuso. 
40 This suggestion is due to Ronald Balvers. 
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Appendix A 
Estimation of the Translog Total Cost Function 
Output cost elasticities can be obtained by estimating parameters of the total cost function. The 
translog cost function developed by Christensen and Greene (1976) has the advantage of not 
imposing  a priori restrictions on the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production. I 
begin with the following specification. 
 
   ln TC = a0 + bL ln pL+ bF ln pF + bK ln pK + bY ln y  
       +
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                                       + bLF ln pL ln pF +bLK ln pL ln pK +bFK ln pF ln pK  
 + gYL ln pL ln y + gYF ln pF ln y + gYK ln pK ln y      (A.1) 
 
Here subscripts L, F, K are used for labor, fuel and capital respectively; pX denotes price of the 
input X; y denotes output. 
 
To obtain efficient estimates, the above specification is commonly estimated simultaneously with the 
input cost share equations. The usual restrictions of homogeneity of degree one in input prices and 
symmetry of input price cross-effects are imposed as well. This leads to the system of equations 
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Equations (A.2.a-c) are estimated as a seemingly unrelated system with the usual restrictions of 
homogeneity of degree one in input prices and symmetry of input price cross-products. 
 
The elasticities of total cost with respect to output are then calculated for each firm at the means of  
observations according to the following formula 
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Appendix B 
The Method of Calculating Bertrand Prices. 
The method uses the additivity of the market supply function and the fact that marginal cost functions 
of producers represent their supply curves in a competitive market. Marginal costs of producers can 
be obtained using the relationship established by formula (A.3)  
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where ATCi denotes average total cost of the firm i. 
Substituting the expression for e i  from (A.3) into (B.1), marginal cost is expressed as 
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Thus, after the coefficients of the total cost function (A.2) are estimated, marginal cost functions for 
every producer can be computed according to the formula (B.2), assuming that average total cost 
remains constant within the range of output considered.  
 
In the Bertrand case, every firm will choose to produce the amount of output at which marginal cost 
is equal to the market price. Thus, the supply curve of a firm in Bertrand oligopoly can be written as 
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where p' is the market price. 
 
Total market supply is found by adding up the supplies of all producers. By varying p' exogenously 
a point can be found at which the total market supply is equal to the certain level of demand set at 
its historical or projected value. This price p*B is a market equilibrium price in the Bertrand model. 
The price p*B will be equal to the marginal cost of the highest-marginal-cost producer(s) in the 
market. In a broad enough market it will likely be the case that some producers will have marginal 
cost lower than p*B at any level of output. In the Bertrand oligopoly those infra-marginal (baseload) 
producers will operate at full capacity, and earn an economic rent. Some other producers' marginal 
cost may be lower than p*B at some range of output, and exceed p*B in another range of output. 
Those producers will be marginal (or peaking) producers. The output of marginal producers will 
fluctuate greatly depending on instantaneous demand. Marginal firms will only use a part of their 
capacity at a time. The most expensive generators of the marginal firms will earn zero economic 
profit at any given time period. Yet other producers may have marginal cost exceeding p*B at all 
levels of output. Such producers will make economic losses and eventually will be phased out of the 
market.  
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Appendix C 
Description of Data Used to Estimate the Translog Total Cost Function 
 
The variables for the translog cost function estimation were obtained as follows.  
TC - Total Cost. Combined cost of operation and maintenance, fuel, and labor, thousands of 
dollars per year. 
pL - Price of labor. Annual salaries and wages per employee, thousands of dollars. 
pF - Price of fuel, dollars per BTU. 
y - Output, MMWhr/year 
pK - Price of capital.  
Estimated as a weighted average of prices of debt and equity. The nominal price of long-
term debt is taken equal to yield on utility bonds issued during the period under 
consideration. Because the overall rating of the firm’s debt affects its cost of borrowing, 
rating of newly issued bonds was matched with the rating of the particular utility’s debt. 
The price of equity was obtained according to the model of dividend growth (see, e.g., 
Morin, 1984). The price of equity capital at the time period t is expressed as 
pKt  = (Dt+1 /pSt ) + g, 
where  Dt+1 is an expected dividend per share, Dt+1 = Dt (1+g), pSt is current period stock 
price, g is an expected rate of dividend growth (obtained as an estimate from the 
exponential growth model based on 20-year historical rates of growth). Using the 
expression for Dt+1, pKt can be presented as 
pKt  = Dt (1+g)/pSt  + g, 
where Dt /pSt is the yield in period t. 
 
All nominal variables were converted into real values expressed in constant 1996 dollars. 
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Appendix D 
 
Algebraical Expressions of Total Derivatives of the Threshold Price P*  
With Respect to Various Parameters of the Valuation Equations  
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Total derivative dP*/dC = 
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Finite-time model. Total derivative dP*/dT=  
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Appendix E 
A Sample Mathematica Program for Computing the Threshold Prices P* 
 
 
c = 12.845;
i = 218.192;
d = 0.1;
r = 0.05 ;
sigma = 0.2;
x1 = H-0.5 + Hr -dL Hsigma^2LL^2 + H2*r Hsigma^2LL  N;
x2 = Sqrt@x1D  N;
x3 = 0.5- Hr - dL  Hsigma^2L  N;
"Beta 1"
b1 = x3+ x2  N
"Beta 2"
b2 = x3- x2  N
"Q"
b3 = HHb1rL - Hb1 -1L dL  Hb1- b2L  N
h := HcrL +i;
s@p_D := Hb1 - b2L* b3 * Hc^H1 - b2LL * Hp^b2L - b1 *h + Hb1 - 1L * p d  N
FindRoot@s@pD  0, 8p, c<D
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Appendix F 
The Form of the Log-Likelihood Function Used for Estimating Risk Attitudes 
 
A log-likelihood function of a system of equations with two independent variables and error terms 
that are jointly normally distributed can be written as 
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where T is the number of observations, n is a vector of error terms, and W is a variance-covariance 
matrix of the random variables y1 and y2. The log-likelihood of the sample is a function of the 
random variables given by the vector y = (y1t’, y2t’). The parameters to be estimated are 
represented by the vector g = (a, b). Further, we define n and W in the following way: n = 
e
e
1
2
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú , 
W = s s
s s
1
2
12
12 2
2
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú . Using these definitions, we can rewrite the log-likelihood function in the explicit 
form 
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Because the function L (y, g) is nonlinear, the maximum likelihood estimator g* is obtained by using 
a numerical algorithm to maximize (E.2) with respect to g. As shown by Amemiya (1985, p. 114), 
under fairly general conditions, the estimator g* is consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed. 
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Appendix G 
Estimating the Variance of the Coefficients of Risk Aversion 
 
The formulas relating risk aversion coefficients to the estimated parameters a1 and a2 and the profit 
p are 
l = - (a1 + 2a2p) 
r = - (a1 p+ 2a2p2) 
d = 2a2 + (a1 + 2a2p)
2 
Variance of l  
Var(l) = Var(a1) + 2pCov(a1, a2) + p2Var(a2) 
Variance of r  
Var(r) = p2Var(a1) + 2p3Cov(a1, a2) + p4Var(a2) 
Variance of d 
First, we present d as d = 2a2 + l2. Then Var(d) becomes 
Var(d) = Var(2a2 + l2) = 4Var(a2) + 4Cov(a2, l2) + Var(l2) 
A linear Taylor series approximation is useful to find the Var(l2)  
Var[g(X)] = {E[gX(X)]}2Var(X), 
so that 
Var(l2) = (2l)2Var(l) = 4l2Var(l) = 4l2 [Var(a1) + 2pCov(a1, a2) + p2Var(a2)] 
To find the Cov(a2, l2)  we apply a bivariate extension of the Stein’s lemma 
Cov[X, h(Y, Z)] = E[hY(Y, Z)]Cov(X, Y) + E[hZ(Y, Z)]Cov(X, Z). 
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Thus 
Cov(a2, l2) = Cov[a2, (-a1 - a2p)2] = Cov[a2, (a12 + 2a1a2p + a22p2)] =  
E(2a1 + 2a2p)Cov(a1, a2) + E(2a1p + 2a2p2)Var(a2)  
= 2(a1 + a2p)[ Cov(a1, a2) + p Var(a2)] = -2l[ Cov(a1, a2) + p Var(a2)] 
Summing up, 
Var(d) = 4Var(a2) - 8l[ Cov(a1, a2) + p Var(a2)] +  
4l2 [Var(a1) + 2pCov(a1, a2) + p2Var(a2)] =  
4l2Var(a1) + Cov(a1, a2)[8pl2 – 8l] + Var(a2)[4p2l2 – 8pl + 4] 
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